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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE. 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This Appeal arises from a medical malpractice/wrongful death action, Plaintiffs Vaghn 
Schmechel, Robert Lewis, Kim Howard and Tamara Hall ( collectively "Plaintiffs") filed against 
Defendants Thomas J. Byrne ("Mr. Byrne"), Clinton Dille, M.D., ("Dr. Dille") and Southern 
Idaho Pain and Rehabilitation Institute (collectively, "Defendants"). The Plaintiffs alleged the 
Defendants were negligent in the dosing of a pain medication, methadone, and in the instructions 
regarding its use given to the decedent, Rosalie Schmechel ("Mrs. Schmechel"). The case was 
tried to a Jury from October 16-30, 2007. The Jury unanimously found no Defendant violated 
the standard of care. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial asserting evidentiary and instruction 
errors. The District Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
Prior to being seen at Southern Idaho Pain and Rehabilitation Institute ("SIP!"), on 
September 26, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel had a long history of severe back and leg pain, including 
multiple surgical interventions, and other health issues. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1051, L. 4 - p. 1054, L. 
8). Kimberly Vorse, M.D. a sleep and pain medicine physician in Sun Valley, Idaho, had treated 
Mrs. Schmechel for pain and sleep apnea for years. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 507, LL. 3-8 ). Mrs. 
Schmechel decided she wanted to find a pain management provider closer to her home in Twin 
Falls. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 870, LL. 4-17). Thus, she was referred to SIP! for pain management. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 1252, LL. 14-20). 
SIP! is a Twin Falls, Idaho pain management clinic and surgery center dedicated to pain 
management treatment. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1375, L. 14-p. 1376, L. 9). In 2001, Dr. Dille hired 
Mr. Byrne to work as a physician assistant at SIP!. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1381, LL. 1-8). Physician 
assistants examine patients, treat patients, prescribe medications, and treat a number of illnesses. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1237, L. 5 - p. 1239, L. 9). Mr. Byrne was licensed by the state ofldaho. While 
employed at SIP!, Mr. Byrne had extensive experience and expertise prescribing OxyContfo, 
methadone and other pain medications, and had treated numerous patients like Mrs. Schrnechel. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1387, L. 2 -p. 1390, L. 25). 
When she presented to SIP!, Mrs. Schmechel had been taking a long acting opioid, 
OxyContin, 60 mg a day, and for break through pain, up to six Lortab, 7.5 mg tablets per day. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1266, LL. 10-22). 
When Mr. Byrne saw Mrs. Schmechel on September 26, 2003, he performed a full 
physical examination and obtained a complete and detailed medical history. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1255, 
LL. 5-21). Based upon Mrs. Schmechel's evaluation, it became apparent her existing pain 
management program was unsatisfactory. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1286, L. 12- p. 1287, L. 6). In fact, 
Mrs. Schmechel indicated on her pain questionnaire that her subjective view of her daily pain 
was a l O on a l O point scale. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1276, LL. 11-17). 
Mrs. Schrnechel did not feel the OxyContin was working adequately, nor as effectively as 
it once had worked. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 1289, LL. 3-15). Mr. Byrne discussed with Mrs. Schrnechel 
that sometimes, after being on a pain medication for a long time, changing to different opioid 
medication often helped provide better pain control. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1289, LL. 3-15). Because of 
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its long acting potential to help with neuropathic pain such as she had, Mr. Byrne suggested that 
they try methadone. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1289, LL.16-22). He explained to her that methadone was a 
long acting opiod that achieved this long acting effect by slowly building up in one's system. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 1290, L. 17 - p. 1291, L. 16). Just like OxyContin, methadone is an opioids and 
is a very commonly used pain medication because of its effectiveness, long acting nature and its 
low cost. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1679, L. 15 -p. 1680, L. 3). Mr. Byrne then explained the inherent 
risks of methadone, including risks due to its long half life that can cause it to build up and 
potentially cause respiratory depression and death. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1291, L. 17-p. 1292, L. 14). 
Mr. Byrne calculated her conservative starting conversion dose of methadone at 30 mg 
per day (15 mg twice daily) based upon his extensive experience converting patients from 
OxyContin to methadone. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1294, L. 13-p. 1295, L. 7). There was no dispute at 
trial that this was a reasonable starting conversion dose based on her prior daily 60 mg 
OxyContin dose. To avoid any undue side effects from unexpected sensitivity to the 
medication, Mr. Byrne instructed her to start by taking 5 mg of methadone two times per day and 
gradually increase over the next few days to the conversion starting does of 15 mg twice a day. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1295, L. 8- p. 1296, L. 10). 
Mr. Byrne instructed her to come back and be seen by Dr. Dille within two weeks. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 1302, L. 11-p. 1303, L. 1). To see how she was doing, Mr. Byrne called Mrs. 
Schmechel on Sunday, September 28, 2003. Mrs. Schmechel reported she was doing well, had 
no adverse side effects, and had some improved pain control though she was still having 
considerable pain. Mr. Byrne told her during that call she could increase to 10 mg twice a day. 
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(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1313, L. I - p. 1314, L. 2). As instructed by Mr. Byrne, Mrs. Schmechel called 
him the next day, September 29, 2003. Again, she stated that her pain control was continuing to 
improve, and was not having adverse reactions though was still having pain. He instructed her 
to begin taking from IO to 15 mg of methadone two times per day; /. e. she could take up to the 
staring conversion dose that had been calculated. She was instructed to follow up as planned and 
to call with any problems. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1320, L. 4 - p. 1321, L. 12). 
That same day, Mr. Byrne discussed Mrs. Schmechel's case with Dr. Dille. He informed 
him of her history of back pain and sleep apnea, and that he had changed her long acting opiod 
from OxyContin to methadone to get better pain control. Dr. Dille approved Mr. Byrne's 
treatment plan. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1322, L. 4-p. 1323, L. 13). 
Mrs. Schmechel died sometime the morning of October 2, 2003. Conflicting testimony 
was presented whether she died from an overdose of her pain medications or from a fatal cardiac 
dysrythmia caused by her underlying cardiac conditions found at autopsy. (Cf Tr. Vol. I, p. 
931, L. 6-p. 965, L. 6; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1581, L. 17-p. 1650, L. 17). 
II. ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL. 
I. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in excluding Plaintiffs from offering 
Dr. Stephen Lordon's testimony concerning the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement; 
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. James Smith to testify 
regarding his causation opinions; 
3. Whether the District Court erred in not admitting the IDAP A Regulations or by not 
giving a negligence per se instruction based upon the ID APA Regulations; and 
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4. Whether the District Court erred in bifurcating the issue of recklessness from the issues 
initially submitted to the Jury. 
III. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
Respondents Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain and Rehabilitation Institute 
request their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees on appeal. Idaho App. R. 40; Idaho App. R. 
41; J.C.§ 12-121. 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
1. The Exclusion Of Undisclosed Expert Testimony Regarding The Delegation Of 
Services Agreement Does Not Require A New Trial. 
A. Background Regarding The Non-Disclosure. 
The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on January 5, 2006. (R. Vol. I, pp. 28-36). On March 
26, 2006, the parties entered a stipulation requiring Plaintiffs' expert disclosures 180 days prior 
to trial. (R. Vol. I, pp. 69-72). The expert disclosures were to conform with Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(6)(4). (Id.). Thereafter, the court adopted the Stipulation in its Scheduling Order. 
(R. Vol. I, pp.73-74). 
Mr. Byrne was deposed on May 18, 2006. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. I 174-1202). At the 
deposition, the written employment contract between Mr. Byrne and the Southern Idaho Pain and 
Rehabilitation Institute ("SIP!") entered in 200 I was produced, along with the applicable job 
description. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp.1203-1204). The Delegation of Services Agreement ("DSA") 
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from 2004 between Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille was also produced. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1205-
1210).1 
During the deposition, Plaintiffs' counsel began a question with a prefatory statement 
suggesting that the 2004 DSA was in effect in 2003, when Mrs. Schmechel was treated. (Supp. 
R. Vol. 6, p.1182). To clarify the record, Dr. Dille's counsel pointed out that the DSA was from 
2004. In addition, he stated his understanding that prior to 2004, a written understanding of the 
scope of practice between the supervising physician and the physician's assistant was to be kept 
at the facility, and a DSA was not required to be filed with the Board of Medicine. (Supp. R. Vol. 
6 p. 1182; Id. at 1169). He then explained his understanding that prior to 2004, the 200 I job 
description and contract fulfilled this obligation. (ld.).2 ln short, Dr. Dille's counsel made a 
1 Prior to the deposition, counsel for Mr. Byrne, Rich Hall, made a request of counsel for Dr. 
Dille and SIPI to provide to him any documents responsive to Plaintiffs' Duces Tecum 
deposition that might be in SIP I's files. The contract, job description, and 2004 DSA were found 
in SIPI's file and provided at the deposition. No other delegation agreement was located. (Supp. 
R. Vol. 6, p. 1169). 
2 In fact, beginning in 2004, the Board of Medicine prescribed the specific form DSA and 
required that form be submitted to the Board of Medicine. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. I I 69); (See also 
the IDAPA § 22.01.03.021.04 (as amended 3/16/2004) (Appendix. A to Respondents' Brief)) 
(Providing that the Agreement be filed with the Board of Medicine). The Rules in effect in 2003 
required only that the DSA and other documents evidencing the physician assistant's scope of 
practice, including job description, be kept at the facility and not filed with the Board. ID APA § 
22.01 .03.030.04 (2003) (Plaintiffs Trial Ex. 39). Both the 2003 and 2004 versions of the 
!DAPAs defined the DSA as a "written document mutually agreed upon and signed and 
dated ... by the parties that defines the working relationship" between the supervising physician 
and the physician's assistant. Both the 2003 and 2004 IDAPAs also indicated the Board of 
Medicine could consider the written Delegation of Services Agreement and any "job 
descriptions, policy statements, or other documents that define the responsibilities of the 
physician assistant .... " Compare IDAPA § 22.01.03.010.06 (2003) (Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 39) with 
IDAPA § 22.01.03.101.04 (2004) (Appendix A to Respondents' Brief). 
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good-faith statement of his understanding and belief at that time regarding applicable Idaho law. 
(Supp. R. Vol. 6, at 1169-70). Further, it was consistent with the fact that no DSA prior to 2004 
was located in SIPI's files, (Id.). 
Later, Plaintiffs' counsel marked the IDAPAs that post dated 2003 as Exhibit 3 to Mr. 
Byrne's deposition. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1198). An objection was asserted that the ID AP As 
Plaintiffs' counsel used for questioning post dated 2003. (Id). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs' counsel 
continued to question Mr. Byrne regarding his obligations under the IDAP As, and his scope of 
practice. (Id at 1198-99). 
Over the next 15 months, Plaintiffs filed their expert disclosures, depositions of all 
disclosed Plaintiffs' experts were taken, and multiple supplemental expert opinion disclosures 
were lodged by the Plaintiffs. Yet, Plaintiffs never disclosed that any of their experts would 
offer opinions of a breach of the DSA, the job description, the IDAP As regarding Mr. Byrne's 
scope of practice, or his legal authority in treating Mrs. Schmechel. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 508-510; Tr. 
Vol. I p. 342, L. 7 top. 344, L. 14). Further, Plaintiffs did not provide the job description, the 
2004 DSA, or any IDAPAs to their experts until October 5, 2007. (Supp. R. Vol. 1, pp. 23-43; 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 238-242). 
Only when Plaintiffs' counsel began preparing for trial in early October did he review the 
applicable 2003 IDAPAs. It was then that he concluded that a signed DSA was required in 2003. 
(Tr. Vol. l, p. 398, LL. 10-16). Based on this determination, he wrote Defendants' counsel 
indicating his view that a signed DSA was required in 2003, and requesting Defendants' counsel 
to "supplement your response." (Supp. R. Vol. 5, p. 944) (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 398, LL. 17-24). In 
7 
response, Counsel for Mr. Byrne asked Mr. Byrne to search his own records again to see if a 
2003 DSA existed, apart from the job description previously produced. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 
I 098). Mr. Byrne conducted a search of his storage facility and discovered a 2003 DSA. He 
immediately provided it to his counsel, who in turn immediately produced it on October 10, 
2007. (Supp. R. Vol. 5, pp. 949-951). 
After receiving the 2003 DSA, the Plaintiffs did not supplement their expert disclosures 
to include opinions regarding the DSA or related subject matter. The first time the Plaintiffs 
indicated that they might present expert testimony regarding the DSA or the scope of 
Mr. Byrne's practice under Idaho law was when Dr. Lordon testified at trial and Plaintiffs' 
counsel posed a question to him regarding the DSA. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 341, LL. 14-23). In 
response, an objection was made. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 341, L. 21 - p. 344, L. 14). The court 
concluded the proposed DSA opinions had not been timely disclosed and sustained the objection. 
(Id.). 
The next day, Plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider the issue and allow their expert, 
James Keller, PA-C, to opine ofan alleged breach of the DSA.3 After lengthy arguments, 
examination of the circumstances and weighing of the potential prejudice to all parties, the court 
3 Plaintiffs have not presented in their opening brief any argument concerning the District 
Court's exclusion of Mr. Keller's proposed testimony concerning the DSA or otherwise argued 
such exclusion was in error. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have waived this issue. St. v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6). The analysis provided here is 
provided for context concerning the District Court's ruling excluding expert testimony 
concerning the DSA and its application here. Discussion of the District Court's ruling regarding 
Mr. Keller's purported opinion herein is not intended to act as a waiver or estoppel by 
Defendants or otherwise be used to suggest that issue is before this Court. 
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adhered to its prior ruling and excluded the purported opinion of Mr. Keller. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 395, 
L. 20 - p. 42 l, L. 19). Nonetheless, the court advised it would allow Plaintiffs to fully cross-
examine the Defendants regarding the DSA, and that Plaintiffs would likely be allowed to offer 
experts testimony in the rebuttal phase of the case to offer the opinions. (Id. at p. 42 l, LL. 7-19). 
Plaintiffs did go on to aggressively cross-examine Mr. Byrne regarding the DSA both in 
Plaintiffs' case and on cross-examination during Defendants' case. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 781, L. 10 - p. 
800, L. 21; p. 805, L. 8-p. 812, L. 16; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1331, L. 8-p. 1333 L. 2; p. 1341 L. 22-p. 
1352, L. 16; p. 1362, L. 6-p. 1664, L. 3) Plaintiffs also were allowed to do the same in cross-
examination of Dr. Dille regarding the DSA and the scope of Mr. Byrne's practice. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
17,L.17-p.1437,L.23;p.1441,L.12-p.1446,L.3). While Plaintiffs' electedtoputon 
rebuttal testimony, they never offered expert testimony regarding the DSA in their rebuttal case. 
Plaintiffs did argue a breach of the DSA during closing arguments. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1924, L. 19 -
p. J 930, L. 3; p. 2036, L. 2 - p. 2038, L. 3). 
After the jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on the part of the Defendants, 
Plaintiffs moved for a new trial. After fully considering its rulings and the facts and 
circumstances supporting its decision, the District Court thoroughly and thoughtfully concluded 
that a new trial was not waITanted. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 506-512). 
B. Standard of Review. 
Upon appeal, this Court reviews a district court's denial of the motion for new trial "for 
an abuse of discretion and will not disturb that discretion absent a manifest abuse of this 
discretion." Johannsen v. Utterbeck, _P.3d _, 2008 WL 4595248 (Idaho 2008) (emphasis 
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added). Likewise, the exclusion of the proposed expert testimony regarding an alleged breach of 
the DSA in the Plaintiffs' case for lack of disclosure is subject to review for an "abuse of 
discretion." Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648,651, 39 P.3d 588,591 (2001). 
This court must uphold the lower court if that court "correctly perceived that the issue was one of 
discretion"; acted within "outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with-the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it"; and "reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 651, 39 P.3d at 59 I ( citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr 
Inc. v. Idaho Power Co, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (I 991 )). 
C. The District Court Correctly Perceived the Issue as One of Discretion and Applied 
Appropriate Legal Standards. 
In its Memorandum Decision denying a new trial and when it ruled at trial, the court 
recognized that the issue was one requiring an exercise of its discretion. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 504-512; 
Tr. Vol. l, p. 341, L. 14-p. 344, L. 15; Tr. Vol. I, p. 396, L. 8-p. 421, L. 19). 
As Plaintiffs did not disclose that their experts would testify that the Defendants breached the 
DSA, the District Court had the discretion to exclude the testimony. Experts and expert opinion 
not disclosed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) or the court's pretrial 
scheduling order, are subject to exclusion. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,874, 136 P.3d 
338, 345 (2006) ("litigants are subject to sanctions, including exclusion of expert testimony, 
when they have failed to supplement an expert's opinion."); Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 
P.3d 810 (2002); Bramwell. 136 Idaho at 651, 39 P.3d at 591 (2001). 
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Rule 26( e) imposes upon a party a continuing obligation of supplementation, including 
expert opinions, and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( e )( 4) expressly provides that "the trial 
court may exclude the testimony of witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a 
required supplementation .... " Idaho R. ofCiv. P. 26(e)(4). Likewise, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(e) gives the District Court broad discretion to sanction a party for failure to comply 
with a court order, such as the scheduling order requiring disclosure of expert opinions. 
Moreover, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure !(a), gives the trial court discretion to make rulings 
regarding the application of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the admission of evidence 
and testimony. Finally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 6(i) allows for the imposition of 
sanctions for violation of a scheduling order. Based on the lack of disclosure by Plaintiffs, the 
District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards 
applicable to the choices available to it, when it excluded the testimony. 
D. The District Court Reached its Decision Through the Exercise of Reason. 
A review of the court's analysis and decision-making process regarding the proposed 
testimony demonstrates that the court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. The 
District Court identified each of the grounds that the Plaintiffs set forth as a basis for a new trial 
including, claiming error in law, accident or surprise, and/or irregularities in the proceedings, and 
in a detailed exercise of reason, decided to not grant a new trial. 4 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 504-512). 
4 The District Court carefully weighed and reached its decision by the exercise of reason to 
exclude the testimony upon the initial objection when the testimony when originalJy offered 
during Dr. Lordon's testimony. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 341, L. 14- p. 344, L. 15). Further, prior to the 
testimony of Mr. Keller, the court heard extensive arguments and engaged in explicit and 
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1. No Supplementation was Made Even after Plaintiffs Received the DSA. 
Plaintiffs excuse their failure to disclose the opinions of their experts based on the timing 
of the production of the 2003 DSA. Certainly, the 2003 DSA was discovered and produced later 
than any party would have liked. However, after examining the underlying circumstances and 
facts, the District Court concluded that there was "no allegation or evidence that Byrne's delay in 
producing the document was malicious or in bad faith." (R. Vol. 3, p. 508). 
Even after Plaintiffs received the 2003 DSA, they took no steps to supplement their 
expert disclosures. The Plaintiffs brush aside the lack of disclosure by asserting that they were 
busy preparing for trial. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 398, L. 10-p. 399, L. 8). It was Plaintiffs' October 4, 
2007 letter, however, stating that the 2003 IDAPAs required a DSA that led to the discovery of 
the 2003 DSA. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 398, L. 10-p. 399, L.8; Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp.1098-1100; Supp. 
R. Vol. 5, p. 944). Thus, Plaintiffs demanded production of the DSA, but when they received it, 
failed to follow up with their experts and supplement their disclosures. Indeed, in the days 
following Plaintiffs' receipt of the 2003 DSA, Plaintiffs took the opportunity to bring many 
issues to the District Court, but did nothing to address the DSA. 5 
detailed fact finding from the parties regarding the circumstances of the late disclosure; weighed 
competing claims of prejudice; and gave Plaintiffs the opportunity to explore the DSA through 
other avenues. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 396, L. 8 - p. 42 l, L. 19). See Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 
Idaho 205, 846 P.2d 207 (I 993) (exercise of reason found and upheld where the court made 
extensive inquiry into the circumstances regarding the disclosure at issue, timing of disclosures 
and potential prejudice). 
5 For example, on October 11, 2007 an all day Motion in Limine hearing was held, but the DSA 
was not broached: not even the fact that it was an issue. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 1-115). Also, on 
October 15, 2007 the District Court received Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Trial 
Memorandum re: Plaintiffs' Expert Jim Keller. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 321-326). That document, signed 
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2. The Issue of Scope of Practice Should Have Been Disclosed Months in 
Advance of Trial. 
The Plaintiffs should have known of the nature of the potential issue regarding 
Mr. Byrne's scope of authority under Idaho law in the 17 months between Mr. Byrne's 
deposition and the trial. Plaintiffs had an obligation to research and independently determine the 
applicable Idaho law, regardless of Defendants' understanding or belief of the law. Plaintiffs' 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have led them to review the 2003 IDAP As and 
determined for themselves the obligations they allegedly imposed upon Defendants, or both of 
them. Indeed, the District Court concluded the Plaintiffs "had full access to the ID APA 
regulations to discover this error. Furthermore, even though the Schmechels had access to both 
the 2001 job description and the 2004 DSA well in advance of trial, none of the Schmechels' 
experts opined that Defendants violated Idaho law governing the DSA and/or job description." 
(R. Vol. I, p. 509). Thus, the court concluded: "Had expert disclosures been made, albeit 
regarding the DSA from the wrong year, or the job description, or even regarding the ID APA 
regulations, such would have mitigated any surprise or late disclosure problem; however ... 
such a disclosure was not made .... " ([d.). The court continued in its reasoning, noting that the 
Plaintiffs had "ample time to discover the error" concerning whether a 2003 DSA was required. 
(Id. at p. 510). Thus, the court found that the late disclosure of the 2003 DSA was not the type of 
after the 2003 DSA had been produced, set forth Mr. Keller's qualifications, as well as identified 
the opinions that he would provide at trial. ([d. at 322-323). However, no mention of the DSA or 
the lawful scope of Mr. Byrne's practice was made. (Id.). 
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"accident or surprise which ordinary prudence should have guarded against that warrants a new 
trial." (Id.). 
A review of the evidence, as was undertaken by the court, supports the court's 
conclusion. The Plaintiffs could have obtained the 2003 ID AP As at any time, including before 
Mr. Byrne's deposition. The fact Plaintiffs were utilizing the incorrect version of the IDAPA (i.e. 
2004 instead of 2003) was even pointed out to them in 2006. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1198). 
However, shortly before trial, Plaintiffs, for the first time, examined the 2003 IDAP As. (Tr. Vol. 
!, p. 398, LL. 10-21). Based on this, Plaintiffs concluded that a 2003 DSA had been required, 
and wrote Defendants regarding the lack ofa 2003 DSA. (Id.). Further, on October 4, 2007, 
before knowing whether there was a 2003 DSA, Plaintiffs sent the IDAP As, and the 2004 DSA 
to their experts. (R. Vol. !, pp. 238-241). Thus, by simply reviewing the 2003 IDAPAs, 
Plaintiffs concluded that a 2003 DSA was required. They could have argued a violation of the 
standard of care for not having a DSA, and could have put that issue to the experts months 
earlier. 
Furthermore, in 2006, Plaintiffs were provided the 2004 DSA and the job description that 
were in place in 2003. 6 (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1182 - 1183). Even without knowledge of a 2003 
DSA, counsel for Plaintiffs could have used the 2004 agreement by simply asking Mr. Byrne or 
6 The relevant language from the 2004 and 2003 DSAs was identical. Both provided: "The 
physician assistant employed with Southern Idaho Pain & Rehabilitation will be utilized in the 
initial evaluation for patients seen in this facility. These patients stem from a physician referral 
base and also patient self-referrals. Patients will require a fuJJ history and physical on initial 
visit. Pertinent findings will be documented and recommendations made. The recommendations 
will be reviewed by the supervising physician to confirm findings and determine a treatment 
plan." (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1209; Supp. R. Vol. 5, p. 965). 
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Dr. Dille to agree that the scope of Mr. Byrne's authority was not greater in 2003 than it was in 
2004, given that in 2004 he would have had more experience and training under Dr. Dille. This 
simple question, regardless of whether a 2003 agreement was ever located, or ever existed, 
would have made the 2004 agreement relevant and could have been utilized by Plaintiffs' and 
their experts, if disclosed as an opinion. Likewise, the 200 I job description could have been sent 
to and used by Plaintiffs' experts to claim it was violated. 
3. The Competing Prejudice to the Parties was Appropriately Weighed. 
The District Court appropriately exercised its discretion when it weighed the competing 
prejudice to the parties regarding the undisclosed opinions. In denying the motion for new trial 
the court noted, "Had the court permitted such testimony, Defendants would have been presented 
with undisclosed expert testimony which they argued at trial they were unprepared to rebut. ... " 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 510). 
Dr. Lordon was deposed twice, with the last deposition occurring in September 2007. He 
did not have the IDAP As, the 2004 DSA, or the 200 l job description. He did not offer any 
opinions of noncompliance with the scope of authority under Idaho law. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 342, L. 7 
- p. 343, L. 1; Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1171 - 1172, atil 6). The same is true of Mr. Keller. In fact, 
he offered no opinions regarding Dr. Dille at his deposition. (Tr. p. 414, L. 2-p. 416, L. 8; 
Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1171 - 1172, at ,i 6; Supp. R. Vol. 7, pp. 1327, Depo, p. 118, LL. 3 - 11 ). 7 
7 Mr. Keller also testified at deposition, in response to a question by Ms. Duke as to whether 
Mr. Byrne had the legal authority to alter Mrs. Schmechel's medication; "Sure, that's by any 
state regulation and supervisory decorum that you have with your supervising physician, a PA 
has the authority to do that." Ms. Duke then asked; "You are not critical of him [Mr. Byrne] 
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The trial court also went to great lengths to limit any prejudice to Plaintiffs from having 
excluded the undisclosed expert testimony. The court provided Plaintiffs free reign to cross-
examine Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne regarding the !DAPAs and the 2003 DSA, including 
contentious examination about whether the documents and rules established the standard of care 
and whether they were breached. Plaintiffs called Mr. Byrne adversely during their case-in-chief 
and again examined him as well as Dr. Dille during Defendants' case. Plaintiffs extensively and 
aggressively cross-examined both Defendants on these issues. 8 (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 781, L. 10 - p. 
792,L. 19;p.805,L.8-p.812,L.16;Tr. Vol.2,p.1331,L.10-p.1333,L.2;p. 1342,L.14-
p. 1352, L. 16; p. 1359, L. 21 - p. 1365, L. l ). The extent that the Plaintiffs were allowed to 
present the issue at trial was highlighted by the court in denying a new trial.9 
In addition, the court also all but invited Plaintiffs to present expert testimony during 
rebuttal as to this issue. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 421, LL. 11 - 19). However, Plaintiffs declined this 
doing that aspect of it?" Mr. Keller answered; "No, absolutely not." (Supp. R. Vol. 7, p. 1311, 
Depo. p. 55, L. 19 - p. 56. L. 3). Furthermore, Plaintiffs other standard of care expert, Dr. 
Lipman, testified in his deposition that he had no contention that Dr. Dille or Mr. Byrne 
"violated any applicable statute or rule of law in the state of Idaho." (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1131, 
Depo. p. 137, LL. 3 - 6). 
8 In response to Plaintiffs cross-examinations, Defendants tried to illicit supportive opinions from 
their experts regarding this issue. However, the court excluded the opinions based on non-
disclosure. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1480, L. 15 - p. 1490, L. 11 ). Thus, the court was even-handed in not 
allowing undisclosed expert testimony concerning the DSA and the scope of practice under 
Idaho law. 
9 Specifically, the court reasoned: "[T]he court allowed the Schmechels to inquire extensively of 
both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille regarding the DSA and the alleged failure to comply with the 
Agreement and abide by Idaho law. While the legal standard in the medical malpractice action 
requires expert testimony to establish breach of the applicable standard of care, both Dr. Dille 
and Byrne were experts in their respective fields and the jury had ample evidence in this regard 
to review and weigh in determining whether a breach of standard of care occurred." (R. Vol. 3, 
pp. 510-511). 
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invitation, despite actually presenting a rebuttal case. This was noted by the court in denying a 
new trial, stating: "Finally, in excluding expert opinion testimony from the Schmechels' case-in-
chief, the court indicated it would consider allowing such evidence on rebuttal. However, the 
Schmechels did not seek to offer such testimony at that juncture. As such, the Schmechels have, 
in effect, waived the issue." (R. Vol. 3, pp. 511 - 512). See Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 652, 39 PJd 
at 592 (upholding exclusion of witness due to late disclosure, noting that appellant had failed to 
call witness in rebuttal despite trial court's invitation). 
E. The Exclusion of Undisclosed Testimony Did Not Alter the Outcome of the Trial. 
Exclusion of the Plaintiffs' retained expert testimony during the case in chief was, at 
worst, harmless error and did not affect a substantial right of the Plaintiffs. In the case of an 
incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial should only be granted if the error "affects a 
substantial right" of the appellants. Highland Enterprises Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,345, 
986 P.2d. 996, l O 11 (l 999). First, it is apparent Dr. Lordon did not actually have an opinion that 
the Defendants breached the DSA or that Mr. Byrne lacked authority under Idaho law to provide 
the care he provided. Indeed, he testified Mr. Byrne could lawfully undertake the care that he did 
and that it was within the scope of his practice. Jo If Dr. Lordon had the opinions that Plaintiffs' 
Jo Specifically, at trial, Dr. Lordon testified as follows: 
Q: It was certainly okay, in your opinion, for Mr. Byrne to 
prescribe medications? 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: That's something Idaho law permits physician assistants to do? 
A: Yes. 
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counsel claimed he did, on redirect, he could have claimed the Defendants had opened the door 
to the DSA opinions. Plaintiffs elected not to do so; suggesting the witness did not actually hold 
the excluded opinion. The failure to redirect effectively waived the trial court's alleged error in 
originally not allowing the undisclosed opinion. 
Second, whether the DSA was breached is moot given Dr. Dille testified in deposition 
and at trial that, even with the benefit of hindsight, he would not have "made any changes nor 
done anything differently than what Mr. Byrne had." (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1164). Dr Dille 
testified at trial that, if anything, he would have not have been as conservative as Mr. Byrne in 
his methadone dosing and follow-up of Mrs. Schmechel. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1408, L. 2 - p. 1409, L. 
l; id. p. 1415, L. 20-p. 1416, L. 13; id. p.1453, L. 15-p. 1454, L. 2). 
Finally, Plaintiffs failed to prove the medical care of Mrs. Schmechel was inappropriate 
and breached the standard of care. Whether Mr. Byrne had the authority to provide that care 
without first consulting Dr. Dille is ultimately irrelevant. Plaintiffs elected to try to prove 
Mr. Byrne should not have been the one making these determinations without first obtaining 
Q: And Idaho law also allows physicians' assistants to evaluate, 
plan, and implement plans of care, and you have no problem 
with that; correct? 
A: I have no problem with that. 
Q: So you are in no way critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated 
Mrs. Schmechel; correct? 
A: No, none whatsoever. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 374, L. 4-p. 375, L. 5). Mr. Keller testified similarly. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 479, L. 17-
p. 479, L. 1). 
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Dr. Dille's approval. But, that did not relieve them of having to prove the decisions themselves 
were medically inappropriate and a breach of the standard of care. 11 
Plaintiffs' claim regarding Mr. Byrne's scope of authority is analogous to a claim of 
negligent credentialing. 12 In states where negligent credentialing is recognized, plaintiffs must 
prove the hospital failed to meet the standard of care in its selection of the physician and granting 
medical staff privileges, and that, while practicing pursuant to the negligently granted medical 
staff privileges, the physician breached the applicable standard of care in his medical care and 
treatment of the patient in question, caused the patient harm. See e.g., Frigo v. Silver Cross 
Hosp. and Medi. Center, 377 Ill. App. 3d 43, 876 N.E.2d 697, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 13 
11 To prove a breach of the standard of care respecting Mrs. Schmechel's treatment, Plaintiffs 
had to prove, based on the medical testimony presented at trial: (1) that the decision to replace 
Mrs. Schmechel's OxyContin with methadone when she was seen by Mr. Byrne and the dosing 
schedule, amounts and instructions he provided to her, or his follow-up care were medically 
inappropriate and thus, a breach of the standard of care; and (2) such medical care not only fell 
below the standard of care, but was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel 's death. 
12 Idaho has not recognized a tort of negligent credentialing and the analysis contained here is for 
illustrative purposes and should not be considered to suggest such a cause of action exists under 
Idaho Jaw. 
13 The well accepted elements of proof in a negligent credentialing claim in those states that 
recognize such claims are: 
! . The hospital granted privileges to a physician, 
2. The physician was unqualified or incompetent, 
3. The hospital knew or should have known the physician was unqualified or 
incompetent, 
4. The physician was negligent when treating the patient, 
5. The physician's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the harm to the 
Plaintiffs. (Emphasis added). 
See Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty Hosp., 301 N.W. 2d 156, 99 Wis.2d 708,301 N.W.2d 156 
(Wis. 1981 ). 
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Leading cases caution it is not enough to prove credentials were negligently given; 
Plaintiff must also establish the medical care was negligent. See generally, Johnson v. 
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wisc. 1981); see also Rule by Rule v. Lutheran 
Hospitals and Homes Soc. of Am., 835 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring the jury to find both 
that the hospital had been negligent in credentialing the physician and the physician had 
committed malpractice in his treatment of the mother in labor); Hiroms v. Scheffey, 76 S.W.3d 
486 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); (physician determined to be not negligent in medical care provided, 
there can be no liability for negligent credentialing). 
The jury's determination that neither Dr. Dille nor Mr. Byrne breached the standard of 
care necessarily included the medical care provided, and makes the issue of the scope of 
Mr. Byrne's authority to initiate that care irrelevant. Thus, the exclusion of the proposed expert 
testimony, even if erroneous, was harmless and did not affect a substantial right of the Plaintiffs. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Admitting Dr. Smith's Causation Opinion. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The District Court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. 
The denial of a new trial based upon alleged error in admitting expert testimony will be reversed 
only on a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, _P.3d _, 2008 
WL 4595248 (Idaho 2008). A trial court does not abuse its discretion ifit recognizes the issue 
as one of discretion; acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the legal standards 
applicable; and comes to its decision by exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc., v. 
Idaho Pwr. Co. 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
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B. The Court Recognized the Issue as One of Discretion and Applied the 
Appropriate Legal Standard. 
In analyzing and rejecting Plaintiffs' request for a new trial, the District Court recognized 
that the issue before it regarding the admission of Dr. Smith's expert opinion was a matter of 
discretion. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 512 - 517). The court also recognized the issue as one of discretion 
when it ruled on Defendants' objection at trial. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1578, L. 14-p. 1579 L. 20). 
The District Court recognized that Rule 26 ( e )( 1) provides that a party is "under a duty 
seasonably to supplement the response with respect to any question directly addressed to ... the 
identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on 
which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the person's testimony." (R. Vol. 3, 
p. 514 ). Likewise, it recognized that if a party does not "seasonably supplement" the responses 
as required by Rule 26( e ), the court may exclude expert opinions not seasonably disclosed or 
supplemented. (R. Vol. 3, p. 514); see also Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 26(e)(4). Thus, a party has a duty 
to supplement expert opinions. In turn, the trial court has the discretion to admit or exclude 
revised expert testimony, based upon its exercise of discretion in determining whether the expert 
opinions were seasonably supplemented. (R. Vol. 3, p. 514). See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 ldaho 
867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006). 
C. The Court Reached Its Decision Through an Appropriate Exercise of Reason. 
1. It Was Clear Early In the Case That Dr. Smith Would Challenge the 
Cause of Death. 
Very early it was clear Defendants were contesting that Mrs. Schmechel died from a 
methadone overdose. On June I 8, 2007, Defendants disclosed their expert witnesses and 
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opinions. (Supp.R. Vol. 1, pp. 172-174). The disclosures indicated Dr. Smith would testify that 
given Mrs. Schmechel's co-morbid conditions and coronary findings on autopsy, it was not 
medically possible to conclude that Mrs. Schmechel's death was more likely caused by an 
overdose rather than another cause of death; specifically a fatal dysrhythmia. (Supp. R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 172 - 174). In addition, the disclosure indicated that Dr. Smith would be called to "rebut the 
testimony of Plaintiffs experts to the extent it involves Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death and her 
life expectancy." (Id.). It was also anticipated that. Dr. Smith would be deposed, and that he 
would testify consistent with his deposition. (Id.). In denying a new trial, the court noted that the 
Plaintiffs were given "early notice" of the "general nature and basis" of Dr. Smith's opinions. 
(R. vol. 3, p. 516-517). 
2. Dr. Smith's Opinion Was Seasonably Supplemented. 
Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, the parties were undertaking discovery and 
trying to schedule various depositions of fact witnesses, treating providers and experts. Plaintiffs 
indicated that they would depose Defense experts, including Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith was to be 
made available for deposition only after Dr. Groben's deposition, as Dr. Smith needed to have 
that testimony to complete his opinions. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1133 - 1134). Throughout the 
summer, attempts were made to schedule and depose Dr. Groben and other individuals from the 
coroner's office who investigated Mrs. Schmechel's death. 14 A few days prior to Dr. Groben's 
14 It was expressly noted in Dr. Smith's disclosure that he would also rely on "the descriptions 
provided regarding the death scene." (Supp. R. Vol. 1, p. 173). Moreover, Dr. Smith was to be 
provided "depositions of plaintiffs' 'experts' and plaintiffs' 'treating physicians'" once taken, 
and that he may rely on any "depositions taken in this case." (Id.). 
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deposition, Plaintiffs cancelled all depositions of Defendants' experts, electing not to proceed 
with them. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1145). Dr. Groben was deposed on July 31, 2007. 15 
Ultimately, in addition to Dr. Groben, the deposition of Deputy Coroner Anton, who 
investigated the death scene, became critical to Dr. Smith and his opinion about the cause of 
death. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 228 - 237; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1591, L. 6 - 21 ). Because of scheduling problems, 
Ms. Anton could not be deposed until September 5, 2007. 16 Ms. Anton testified in her deposition 
that she believed that the manner of death was such that Mrs. Schmechel was awake, sitting up 
on her couch, feet on the floor, a lit cigarette in hand, watching TV at the time she died. 17 (Supp. 
R. Vol. 6, p. 1161, Depo., p. 41 L. 12-p. 44, L. 13). Counsel received the deposition transcript 
of Ms. Anton on September 24, 2007 (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1103- l 104). On September 26, 
2007, the transcript was hand delivered to Dr. Smith. (Id. at p. J l 08). After reviewing 
Ms. Anton's deposition, Dr. Smith met with Defendants' counsel and clarified his opinion. 
15 The affidavit of Keely Duke filed in support of Defendant's opposition to Plaintiffs motion 
for new trial sets forth in detail and documents the history of the scheduling of discovery, 
including the delays and difficulties in completing depositions of key persons, as well as the 
circumstances leading to the supplemental disclosure of Dr. Smith. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1097 -
I 167). 
16 Ms. Anton's deposition was originally scheduled for mid-July 2007 based on her availability. 
However, Plaintiffs' counsel was not available for that deposition during that time frame, 
requiring rescheduling. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, p. 1155). Ultimately, because of Ms. Anton's schedule 
and the schedule of Plaintiffs' counsel, Ms. Anton was not deposed until September 5, 2007. (Id. 
at p. 1160). 
17 The way in which a person dies is called the "manner of death," as compared to the "cause of 
death;" the latter being the medical reason for death. Defendants originally believed that Dr. 
Groben had determined the manner of death based upon the certification in his autopsy report 
that stated: "I am of the opinion that the findings, cause and manner of death are as follows: ... " 
(Supp. R. Vol. 4, p. 752) (Emphasis added). However, it was discovered that Ms. Anton 
determined the manner of death, not Dr. Groben. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 956, LL. 17-25; Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
723, L. 17-p. 735, L. 5; Tr. Vol. I. p. 749, L. 2-p. 751, L. 2). 
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Supplementation of Dr. Smith's opinion was produced on October 5, 2007. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 232-
237). The supplemental expert disclosure, relying on Ms. Anton's testimony that Mrs. 
Schmechel was awake when she died, rather than asleep and heavily sedated, outlined in detail 
Dr. Smith's opinion that Mrs. Schmechel likely suffered a sudden cardiac dysrhythmia caused by 
her underlying cardiovascular disease and other co-morbid conditions. (Id). In essence, 
Ms. Anton's testimony resulted in Dr. Smith simply strengthening his originally disclosed 
preliminary opinion that no person could reasonably say that the drug overdose was more likely 
the cause of death than other potential causes, including cardiac dysrhythmia, to his opinion 
disclosed on October 5, 2007 that sudden cardiac dysrhythmia was a more likely cause of death 
than methadone overdose. 18 
Dr. Smith's opinions were supplemented eleven days prior to trial. This was seasonable 
in light of when Ms. Anton's transcript became available. As the District Court concluded, the 
timing was due to "scheduling difficulties that inevitably arise in a trial of this magnitude." 
(R. Vol. 3. p. 516). Upon receipt of the supplementation, Plaintiffs did not seek to add an 
additional expert, supplement their own expert disclosure, or seek relief of any kind. 19 At trial, 
18 At trial, Dr. Smith underscored the importance of Ms. Anton's testimony that she presented in 
her deposition and at trial. When asked whether Ms. Anton's deposition was critical to his 
opinion, Dr. Smith testified: "It was. I think her deposition as well as the pictures and other 
information I gained from reading those depositions and looking at the photos were very 
important...! think - what I learned from that, it appeared as though Mrs. Schmechel suffered a 
sudden death and that it happened abruptly, and that when you have a sudden death, that all of 
those - when I say almost all 80% to 90% - are going to be cardiac in origin." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 
1591, L. 6- 21). 
19 After the disclosure was made, Plaintiffs did not raise the issue regarding Dr. Smith prior to 
Dr. Smith being called to the stand. This includes the day long Motion in Limine hearing of 
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the District Court properly concluded that it was within its discretion to allow Dr. Smith to 
testify and appropriately explained the reasons why it was allowing the testimony. (Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 1570, L. 20-p. 1579, L. 20). Furthermore, in its opinion denying the Plaintiffs' motion for 
new trial, the court further explained its rationale and reasoning in exercising its discretion to 
deny the motion for new trial as it related to the admission of Dr. Smith's testimony. (R. Vol. 3, 
pp. 514-519). 
The case of Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205,846 P.2d. 207 (1993) 
demonstrates the District Court did not abuse its discretion. In Hopkins, the offering party 
learned of its expert's revised opinion late the night before the witness was to testify, and 
supplemented the disclosure of the expert's opinion to the opposing party verbally the next 
morning. The trial court held this was sufficiently "seasonable" under the circumstances and 
allowed the testimony. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not act outside the 
boundaries of its discretion and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Thus, it 
concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the expert 
testimony. Id In comparison, the general nature of Dr. Smith's testimony was offered months 
in advance of trial. Plaintiffs refused to take his deposition. Upon learning new information 
from a deposition late in proceedings, Dr. Smith's testimony was immediately seasonably 
supplemented eleven days before trial. 
October 11, 2007. During that hearing, Plaintiffs did seek to limit opinion testimony of Dr. 
Groben regarding causation. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 15-p. 27, L. 8; p. 34, L. I -p. 39, L. 20). 
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Finally, Plaintiffs argument that they were deprived of an opportunity to obtain an expert 
to rebut Dr. Smith is not persuasive. Plaintiffs were aware of the nature of the general dispute 
regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmeche!'s death well in advance of trial. Plaintiffs had ample 
expert testimony to support their claim that Mrs. Schmechel died of a methadone overdose.20 
Further, Plaintiffa' suggestion that Dr. Smith, prior to supplementation, did not have an opinion 
that required rebuttal is untrue. Plaintiffs mischaracterize Dr. Smith's original disclosed opinion 
as being inadmissible because it was not an opinion of causation on a "more likely than not 
basis." To the contrary, Dr. Smith always held an opinion on a more likely than not basis that 
the cause of Mrs. Smith's death was not capable of being proven by Plaintiffs; i.e., one 
competing potential cause of death could not be proven to be more likely than another. Only 
when Ms. Anton's deposition transcript became available could, in Dr. Smith's opinion, more 
weight be given to one potential cause of death over another. Further, the change in Dr. Smith's 
testimony was based upon the opinion of Ms. Anton given at her deposition. Plaintiffs had full 
opportunity to challenge Ms. Anton's opinion at her deposition and at trial. All Plaintiffs had to 
do to challenge Dr. Smith's supplemented opinion was challenge Ms. Anton's opinions. 
D. Admitting the Opinion Was Harmless as the Jury did not Reach Causation. 
Any error in allowing the testimony of Dr. Smith was harmless as the jury was not 
required to address the question of causation because it unanimously found that Dr. Dille and 
20 Dr. Lipman testified extensively in his deposition and at trial that methadone was the likely 
cause of death. (Supp. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1252 - 1255, Depo., p. 165, L. 11 - p. 174, L. 2; Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 634, L. 11 -636, L. 13; p. 658, L. 5 -p. 660, L. 19). Plaintiffs also called Dr. Groben and 
elicited expert testimony from him that the cause of death was a methadone overdose. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 932, L. 14-p. 965, L. 4). 
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Mr. Byrne did not breach the standard of care. See Kalams v. Giacchetto, 268 Conn. 244, 250, 
842 A.2d 1100, 1105 (2004)(a medical malpractice case holding a trial court's ruling concerning 
the admissibility of expert testimony concerning causation was at worst harmless error because 
the jury determined there was no breach of the standard of care and never reached the issue of 
causation). As it relates to issues of the admission of evidence, "a new trial is merited only if the 
error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 892, 104 
P.3d 356,366 (2004). Dr. Smith's testimony was presented solely as it related to issues of 
causation i.e., the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death and, had she not died, her reduced life 
expectancy. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1581, L. 12 - p. 1650, L. 17). The jury, on a special verdict form that 
had separate questions for standard of care and causation, concluded that neither Dr. Dille nor 
Mr. Byrne breached the standard of care. Thus it did not even reach the question of causation. 
(R. Vol. 3, p. 444). The testimony of Dr. Smith therefore had no bearing on the outcome of the 
verdict and did not affect a substantial right of the Schmechels. See Gillingham Const., Inc. v. 
Newby-Wiggins Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 23, 121 P.3d 946,954 (2005). 
3. The Court Properly Declined To Formally Admit Into Evidence The IDAP A 
Regulations Or Instruct The Jury Regarding Negligence Per Se. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Plaintiffs' claims the trial court failed to admit the IDAPA Regulations and instruct 
the jury with their proposed negligence per se instruction are both subject to an abuse of 
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discretion standard.21 The trial court is vested with wide discretion in making evidentiary 
rulings, and an evidentiary ruling made in"[ e ]rror is disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest 
abuse of the trial court's discretion and affects a substantial right of the party." Perry v .. Magic 
Valley Reg 'l Med. Ctr , 134 Idaho 46, 5 I, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000). 
The trial court also has wide discretion in instructing the jury. The Supreme Court's 
review of the jury instructions "is generally limited to a determination of whether the 
instructions, when considered as a whole and not individually, fairly and adequately present the 
issues and state the applicable law." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 
986 P.2d 996, l 009 ( 1999). When the instructions, taken as a whole, do not mislead or prejudice 
a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error. Id. Further, "[i)f the 
instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law, no reversible error is 
committed. An erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error where the instruction 
taken as whole neither misleads nor prejudices a party." Id. 
Finally, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, a trial court is given considerable discretion 
to exclude evidence because it would potentially confuse the jury, and absent an abuse of that 
discretion, will not be overturned. Perry, 134 Idaho at 55, 995 P.2d at 825; Burgess v. Salmon 
River Canal Co. Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,573,903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995). 
21 The abuse of discretion standard regarding evidentiary ruling is discussed in prior sections of 
this Brief. Whether violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence per se is a question 
of law. Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001). 
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B. The IDAP A Regulations Cannot Be Used To Establish Negligence Per Se, 
Because They do not Meet the Criteria for Application in This Case. 
1. The IDAPA Regulations Do Not Clearly D~fine the Standard of Conduct. 
Even if negligence per se applied in a medical malpractice case, which Defendants 
dispute as discussed in further detail below, Plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary elements for 
application of the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs cite Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 
Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 188 P.3d 834 (2008) and Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 
(1986) to support their negligence per se argument. Both Sanchez and Obendorfmake clear, 
however, a statue or regulation must meet several elements before it can be used to trigger 
negligence per se. Cf, Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001). 
Plaintiffs did not establish the required elements. 
A claim of negligence per se requires a plaintiff to prove: (l) the statute or regulation 
clearly defines the standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation was intended to prevent the 
harm caused by defendant's act or omission; (3) plaintiff is a person of the class the statute or 
regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation of the statute or regulation must be a 
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078; O'Guin v. 
Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 31 l (2005). Negligence per se is a question 
of law. Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at l 078. 
In Ahles v. Tabor, the district court held that the defendant was negligent per se for 
violating Idaho Code Section 49-633 when he passed the plaintiff's vehicle on the right side and 
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caused a collision.22 Ahles, 136 Idaho at 394, 34 P.3d at I 077. On appeal, this Court addressed 
each of the four required elements and found that element I was not met, and thus reversed the 
lower court, holding "the standard of conduct described in LC. § 49-633, ... is far from clear and 
requires statutory interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of terms used 
in the statute." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079. 
Ultimately, whether the defendant had violated Idaho Code Section 49-633 and could be 
found negligent per se hinged on whether he was traveling off the "roadway" when he passed the 
plaintiff on the right and whether the conditions did not "permit[] such movement in safety." Id. 
In determining the statute was ambiguous for purposes of applying negligence per se, the Court 
noted the legislature had defined the terms "highway" and "roadway" in the Idaho Code, but 
such key terms as "safety" were not defined. The legislature had not provided any guidance to 
assist in defining or interpreting this term. The Court found: "The distinction that the legislature 
intended to make in this statute, however, cannot easily be ascertained, contributing to the 
vagueness of the standard of conduct expressed therein." Id. 
This Court noted the statute did not provide any guidance concerning the width of 
pavement that was sufficient for passing on the right and when the passing movement could be 
22 Idaho Code Section 49-633 reads: 
( l) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only under 
the following conditions: 
(a) When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn; 
(b) Upon a highway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two (2) or more lines of 
vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle. 
(2) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon the right only under 
conditions permitting such movement in safety. That movement shall not be made by driving 
off the roadway. LC. § 49-633 
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done in "safety." The Court held that "[a]ll of these questions add to the complexity of the 
statute and show that the standard of conduct derived from interpreting the statute is less than 
clear and not easily ascertained or applied." !d. Therefore, the statute did not provide a 
"description ofa clear standard of conduct," and "the alleged violation of the statute ... cannot 
be deemed negligence per se." Id. 
Plaintiffs cite Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 188 P.3d 834 
(2008) as support for their claim that the ID AP As establish a clear standard of conduct. The 
Court in Obendorf rejected an argument that the applicable statute was ambiguous based on an 
exception in the statute for using pesticides inconsistent with their label "as provided by rule," 
because the defendant failed to identify any exculpatory rule allowing off label use of the 
pesticide. Obendo~f, 145 Idaho at 899, 188 P.3d at 841. In the absence ofan exculpatory rule, 
the standard provided by the statute was clearly enough to satisfy the first prong of the 
negligence per se analysis. Id 
Unlike Obendorf, but analogous to Ahles, IDAP A Sections 22.01.03 et seq. are not 
sufficiently clear. The IDAP As fail to define key terms necessary to be applied for negligence 
per se purposes in this case. Specifically, as the trial court recognized, the IDAP As are "intricate 
and technical" (R. Vol. 3, p. 525), but "are not in of themselves clear and precise enough to 
allow me to give a negligence per [sic] instruction on them." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1887, LL. 21-24).23 
23 Defendants also cite Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1242 (1986) for the 
proposition that regulations may be used as a foundation for establishing negligence per se. 
Sanchez involved specific OSHA regulations that provided mandatory safety measures to be 
taken when servicing hazardous equipment (e.g. "the engine shall be stopped, the power source 
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For example, IDAPA § 22.01.03.28 SCOPE OF PRACTICE, indicates various items that 
a physician assistant may perform, including, "Diagnose and manage minor illnesses or 
conditions" and "manage the health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with 
the medical regimen initiated by the supervising physician." IDAPA §§ 22.01.03.28.03 and 
22.01.03.28.04. (2003)(Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 39). Contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments, the 
regulations do not clearly and adequately define the standard of conduct and thus do not meet the 
required first prong of the negligence per se analysis. For example, the regulations do not define 
"minor illnesses or condition," "major illnesses or conditions," what constitutes "chronically ill," 
nor do they define the terms "manage" and "initiate." Further, they do not specify whether these 
terms are to be considered in light of the type of practice in which the physician assistant in 
question practices, or other specialized training or experience he may have. As such, what 
constitutes a "minor" or major illness or condition is ambiguous and left to interpretation, as is 
what constitutes "managing" care of a "stable chronically ill patient," and what constitutes 
"initiat[ion]" ofa "medical regimen" by a supervising physician.24 
disconnected, and all machine movement stopped before servicing or maintenance is 
performed."). Sanchez, 112 ldaho at 616, 733 P.2d at 1241. Such regulations are in clear 
contrast to the regulations at issue here that are not explicit in nature and do not provide specific 
guidance regarding personal conduct. 
24 The District Court agreed, noting: "Likewise, there is no evidence that these terms have 
definite and universally understood meanings within the medical community. The fact that these 
regulations do not clearly define the applicable standard of care is illustrated by the fact that the 
Schmechels' own expert testified at trial that Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel did not 
violate Idaho law. Specifically, Dr. Lordon testified as follows: 
Q: [By Ms. Duke] Physician assistants evaluate and treat patients, and they do minor 
medical procedures; correct? 
A: That is correct. 
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Highlighting these terms inherent ambiguity was conflicting trial testimony concerning 
these terms. Mr. Byrne and others testified that in a pain management practice, 
Mrs. Schmeche!'s condition was "minor," and that she was not a "complex" patient, nor was he 
treating her for a "chronic condition." There was also testimony that the treatment he provided in 
switching from OxyContin to methadone was a "minor" change and not at all "complex." In 
addition, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Byrne "initiated" a treatment 
regimen, or ifit was done, as a dynamic process, which included Dr. Dille's approval of the 
general plan the next business day and the plan for Mrs. Schmechel to be seen by Dr. Dille to 
confirm and complete the treatment initiation.25 Therefore, the IDAPA Regulations were not so 
clear as to be used to establish negligence per se. 
Q: And that's all appropriate for them to do those things? 
A: Yesitis 
Q: It was certainly okay, in your opinion, for Mr. Byrne to prescribe medications? 
A: Absolutely. 
Q: That's something Idaho law permits him to do? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And Idaho law also allows physician assistants to evaluate, plan, and implement plans of 
care, and you have no problem with that; correct? 
A: I have no problem with that. 
Q: So you are in no way critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated Mrs. Schmechel; correct? 
A: No, none whatsoever. 
(Duke Aff. Ex. 5, at 66: l 3 - 67:25.) Because there could be considerable disagreement regarding 
what certain key terms mean, the ID APA regulation does not "clearly define the required 
standard of conduct." (R. Vol. 3, pp 522-523). 
25 Such testimony included the following: From Mr. Byrne (Tr. Vol. 1, p.787, L. 3 -p. 792, L. 4; 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1248, L. 25 -p. 1252, L. 13; p. 1284, L. 16-p. 1286, L. 7; p. 1296, L. 11-p. 
1297,L. l9;p. l324,LL.2-l2;p.1331,L.10-p.1333,L.2;p. l342,L. 11-p. 1343,L.9;p. 
1344,L.20-p. 1352,L. 16;p.1353,L. 1-p. 1357,L.20;p. 1359,L.2.1-p. 1361,L. lJ;p. 
1362, L. 6-p. 1365, L. 2.). From Dr. Dille (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1382, L. 11-p. 1389, L. 9; p. 1389, 
L.21-p. 1391,L.22;p. 1395,L. 14-p. 1398,L.22;p. 1403,L.23-p. !409,L. l;p.1411,L. 
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2. The Alleged Violation of the IDAPAs was not the Proximate Cause of 
Death. 
The fourth requirement element of negligence per se is that "the violation must have been 
the proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078. As discussed 
earlier in this brief, Dr. Dille testified he would not have treated Mrs. Schmechel any differently 
than Mr. Byrne did and would not have made any changes nor done anything differently than 
what Mr. Byrne had. If anything, he might have been less conservative than Mr. Byrne. (See 
analysis in Section I (E), above). 
In addition, as with the claimed error in not admitting undisclosed testimony regarding 
the DSA, any alleged violation of the IDAPAs was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's 
death. Specifically, even if the IDAP As were violated, Plaintiffs still had an obligation to prove 
that the medical care itself fell below the standard of care, regardless of who provided it. Because 
the jury found there was no violation of the standard of care, it had to·have determined the 
medical treatment itself was appropriate and did not breach the standard of care. As such, an 
error in instructing regarding the IDAPAs or in excluding them from evidence was harmless in 
light of the jury's verdict. (See analysis in Section 4(l)(E), above). 
3 - p. 1412, L. 13; p. 1429, L. 16-p. 1430, L. 25; p. 1442, LL. 3 - 18; p. 1451, L. 5 -p. 1453, 
L. 14). From Mr. Kottenstette (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1503, L. 1-p. 1504, L. 14; p.1552, L. 9-p. 1554, 
L. 3). From Dr. Smith (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1638, LL. 7-24; p. 1648, L. 11 -p. 1649, L. 4). From Dr. 
Hare (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1673, L. l l - p. 1675, L. 2; p. 1682, L. 7 - p. 1683, L. l; p. 1683, L. l 9- p. 
1684, L. 5; p. 1727, L. 13 - p. 1728, L. 6). From Dr. Binager (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1811, L. 25 - p. 
18l6,L.25;p.1826,L. 19-p. 1827,L.8;p.1828,L.15-p.1829,L.15;p.1832,LL.5-20). 
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C. Negligence Per Se is Inapplicable in a Medical Malpractice Case. 
The court below properly recognized the inapplicability of negligence per se in the 
context of a medical malpractice action.26 Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-101327 require a 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to prove both the standard of care and a breach of that 
standard of care through direct expert testimony. 28 
26 The District Court noted:" ... [I]t is doubtful that a negligence per se instruction should be 
given in a medical malpractice action brought pursuant to LC.§§ 6-1012 and 1013. Under LC.§ 
6-1012 a medical negligence plaintiff 'must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief, 
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the competent 
evidence, that [the] defendant ... negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health 
care practice .. .' I.C. § 6-1012." (R. Vol. 3, p. 524). 
27 Idaho Code section 6-1012 provides: 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person, 
brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of health care, ... on 
account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on account of any 
matter incidental or related thereto, such claimant or plaintiff must, as an essential 
part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and 
by a preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such defendant then and 
there negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of 
the community in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided ... 
. (Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code section 6-1013, in turn, provides, "The applicable standard of practice and 
such a defendant's failure to meet said standard must be established in such cases by such 
a plaintiff by testimony of one (I) or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses ... 
. " (Emphasis added). 
28 In this case, Plaintiffs did not offer any direct expert testimony that Mr. Byrne or Dr. Dille 
violated the relevant !OAP A provisions. The only experts to address whether the !OAP As were 
breached were the Defendants, both of whom testified they met the standard of care. In the 
absence of admissible direct expert testimony establishing the !OAP A defined the standard of 
care and a breach of that standard of care, the issue of whether the !OAP As were breached 
should not have even been presented to the jury, and could not have supported a finding of 
liability. See Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 ldaho 160, 163-164, 45 P.3d 816, 
819-20 (2002); Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 134 ldaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000). 
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Because Idaho requires "direct expert testimony" to prove the standard of care and a 
breach thereof, it would be inconsistent with the specific statutory requirements ofldaho Code 
sections 6, I OJ 2 and 6-1013, to apply a common law theory of liability, negligence per se. The 
very concept of negligence per se, by which a standard of care is established without expert 
testimony and no proof of a violation of the standard is provided through direct expert testimony, 
is contrary to the express statutory requirements ofldaho's medical malpractice statutes. Indeed, 
if negligence per se were to apply to medical malpractice actions, plaintiffs could put on their 
case by merely having the jury instructed that the violation of a particular statute or regulation is 
negligence without the plaintiff ever calling or presenting an expert witness. Cleary, this would 
violate the more specific mandate of Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
While Idaho has never squarely addressed this issue, it has rejected other similar common 
law theories that would ignore the statutory requirement of direct expert testimony. For 
example, in Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,334,940 P.2d 1142, 1153 
( 1997) this Court explicitly held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply in Idaho to 
medical malpractice actions given Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013's expert testimony 
requirements. Kolln, supports the argument that negligence per se also does not apply in a 
malpractice action in Idaho. Both res ipsa loquitor and negligence per se are common law 
negligence doctrines that are supplanted by Idaho Code sections 6,1012 and 6-1013's expert 
testimony requirements for establishing medical negligence in Idaho. 
Other jurisdictions have held the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case cannot use the 
doctrine of negligence per se to circumvent the requirement of establishing the standard of care 
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and a breach of that standard of care through direct expert testimony. For example, in Shelton v. 
Sargent, 144 S.W.3d I 13 (Tex. App. 2004), the plaintiffs claimed the defendants missed a breast 
cancer diagnosis. The plaintiffs asserted negligence as well as negligence per se theories based 
on the Federal Mammogram Quality Standards Act of 1992 and the Texas Cancer Incidence 
Reporting Act. 29 On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals held the plaintiffs could not 
"circumvent the requirement of expert testimony by merely substituting evidence of violation of 
a statute," and thus a breach of a statue cannot be used as the basis for a negligence per se claim 
in a medical malpractice case. Shelton, 144 S.W, 3d at 122. 
D. It Was Appropriate to Not Send the IDAPAs Back With the Jury. 
Idaho courts may take judicial notice of indisputable facts. Idaho R. Evid. 20 I. They 
may also take judicial notice of relevant regulations. See e.g. State v. Howard, 122 Idaho 209, 
213, 832 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Ct. App. 1992). However, courts generally agree it is proper to 
exclude from evidence items such as copies of statues and rules and regulations, which if 
admitted, would "invite the jury to substitute its own view of the law" for the court's instructions 
and because "it would be most confusing to the jury to have legal material introduced as 
evidence." US. v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2008), quoting Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. 
v. Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312,332 fn. 26 (1st Cir. 2004)(per curiam)(Lipez, J., 
29 Texas does not have the strict statutory requirement that Idaho does for direct expert testimony 
to prove medical negligence, but rather simply applies the common law rule requiring expert 
testimony in a medical malpractice case because of the complexity of the issues, unless a 
plaintiff can establish the presence of negligence through res ipsa loquitor. Shelton 144 S. W.3d 
at 122, citing Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 492, 509 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001), pet. 
denied). In comparison, Idaho does not even permit res ipsa loquitor in a malpractice case. 
Kolln, 130 Idaho at 334, 940 P.2d at 1153. 
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concurring); See also Morant v. Long Island, R.R., 66 F.3d 518, 522 (2d Cir. 1995)(affirming 
exclusion of federal railroad regulations from evidence despite allowing testimony relating to the 
regulations and use of the regulations in closing argument). 
Although the district court did not formally admit the ID APA Regulations into evidence, 
it allowed Plaintiffs to freely cross examine Mr. Byrne with the IDAPAs and allowed Plaintiffs 
to display them to the jury and invited Plaintiffs to use the Regulations in their closing argument. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 1344, L. 8-p. 1365, L. I; p. 1888, L. 4-p. 1889, L. 13). Plaintiffs, therefore, 
had ample opportunity to present their theory premised on a violation of the IDAP As to the jury 
through effective cross-examination and argument. The court was justifiably concerned, 
however, that admitting the ID APA Regulations into evidence and allowing the jury to take them 
back to the jury room would lead to juror confusion and invited the jury to interpret the law for 
themselves and ignore the court's instructions.Jo (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1888, L. 11, -p. 1889, L. 8). 
E. The Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instruction Inappropriately Commented on the 
Evidence and was Argumentative. 
As a general rule, jury instructions should not comment on the evidence offered at trial 
and a trial court should not instruct the jury using a proposed instruction that goes beyond 
defining the law into commenting on the evidence. Lankford v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 126 Idaho 
JO Regarding the IDAPAs, the District Court stated, "To me, it seems that this is overly 
burdensome upon the jury to sit back and try to make sense of legal regulations that may or may 
not apply as they determine the facts of this instance." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1888, L. I 7 - P. 1889, L. 
8). Indeed, an analogy can be made to learned treatises, which may be used by experts, read 
aloud, displayed to the jury, but are not generally permitted to be admitted formally into 
evidence and given to the jury to take with them into deliberations, because of the potential for 
confusing the jury. See Idaho R. Evid. 803(18). See also Idaho R. Evid. 403. 
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187, 189-190, 879 P .2d 1120, 1122 - 1123 (1994 ). In this case, the trial court provided the jury a 
general negligence instruction concerning the definition of negligence and then instructed the 
jury of the standard of care as defined by Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. (R. Vol. 3, p. 
411 -p. 442). 
The Plaintiffs were not satisfied with these instructions and requested a specific 
instruction concerning the IDAP A Regulations that stated: 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is 
authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as 
physician assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. A 
"supervising physician" is person registered by the Board who is licensed to 
practice medicine in Idaho, who is responsible for the direction and supervision of 
the activities of the physician assistant. A "physician assistant" is a person who 
has been authorized by the Board of Medicine to render patient services under the 
direction of a supervising physician. 
Under the applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendant in this case 
were required to have in place a delegation of services agreement which defined 
the working relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne. Pursuant to the Board 
of Medicine regulations, a physician assistant may issue written or oral 
prescriptions only in accordance with approval and authorization granted by the 
Board of Medicine and in accordance with the delegation of services agreement 
and shall be consistent with the regular prescriptive practice of the supervising 
physician. 
Under the Southern Idaho Pain Institute's Delegation of Services Agreement 
applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct an initial evaluation 
of patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and physical, and thereafter 
document his findings and recommendations. It was the duty of Dr. Dille, 
pursuant to the Board of Medicine regulations and the Delegation of Services 
agreement [sic], to review the recommendations of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter 
confirm his findings and to determine a treatment plan. 
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or 
the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of 
care. 
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(R. Vol. 2, pp. 338-39). 
The Court declined to use Plaintiffs' proposed instruction and instead provided a general 
negligence instruction and instructions concerning Idaho Code section 6-!0!2 and 6-!013. In 
addition, in Instruction No. 28, it instructed the jury: "You are instructed that the court takes 
judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act,§ 22.01.03 (2003), entitled 'Rules for 
the Licensure of Physician Assistants.' The rules were in effect in 2003." (R. Vol. 3, p. 426). 
The court also gave Plaintiffs ample opportunity to align this instruction with the evidence and to 
put it in perspective by specifically licensing Plaintiffs to freely show the jury the ID AP As in 
closing argument and argue their interpretation of these Regulations during their closing 
argument. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.1888, L. 11 - p. 1889, L. 8). Plaintiffs chose not to do so in their 
closing argument, but this was their own tactical choice. 
F. Any Error Regarding the Admissibility of the IDAPAs was Harmless. 
The Plaintiffs suffered no prejudice through the court's refusal to send the IDAPAs back 
to the jury. When a party is allowed to read a safety code to the jury and question witnesses with 
the document, the complaining party does not suffer any prejudice. See Alexander v. Conveyors 
& Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1984) ("No substantial right of Alexander's was 
affected by the failure to admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already 
been read and shown to the jury."). Given the trial court's liberal grant of permission to 
Plaintiffs to show the ID AP As to the jury, to question the Defendants concerning the regulations, 
and to argue their interpretation of them to the jury, the trial court's refusal to submit the IDAPA 
Regulations to the jury as evidence was, if error, harmless error. 
40 
4. Bifurcating The Issue Of Recklessness Was Appropriate. 
A. Standard of Review. 
On appeal, this Court's review of jury instructions is limited to a determination of 
whether the instructions, when considered as a whole and not individually, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 
330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999). If the instructions fairly and adequately present the issues 
and state the law, no reversible error is committed. Highland Enterprises, Inc., 133 Idaho at 343, 
986 P.2d at 1009. An erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error where the 
instruction taken as whole neither misleads nor prejudices a party. Id. The appellant has the 
burden to clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury instruction. Garcia v. Windley, 
144 Idaho 539,543, 164 P.3d 819,823 (2007). 
Furthermore, the trial court has discretion to bifurcate claims and issues and, absent an 
abuse of that discretion, this Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling concerning bifurcation of 
issues or claims. See Idaho R. ofCiv. P. 42(b); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 80,644 P.2d 1333, 
1339 (1982). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to bifurcate the recklessness 
issue from the other issues initially submitted to the jury and the jury instructions, when read as a 
whole, fairly and adequately presented the relevant issues to the jury. 
B. Recklessness Was Irrelevant Unless and Until the Jury Awarded Damages In 
Excess of the Statutory Non-economic Damages Cap. 
Plaintiffs sought to have the jury determine whether Mr. Byrne was reckless for purposes 
of piercing the cap on non-economic damages, in the event the jury returned a verdict exceeding 
the statutory cap. Defendants objected to the Plaintiffs' proposed reckless instruction. (R. Vol. 2, 
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p. 374 - p. 378). Ultimately, the Court bifurcated the recklessness issue and decided it would 
only instruct on recklessness if the jury returned a verdict with an award that implicated the 
statutory non-economic damages cap. In doing so, the court properly weighed the evidence, the 
potential for prejudice, and the applicable law. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1883, L. 11 - 1884, L. 17). 
Idaho's tort reform statutes limit non-economic damages in personal injury and wrongful 
death cases in the absence of "willful or reckless misconduct" to a cap of $250,000 plus or minus 
an annual statutory adjustment. Idaho Code section 6-1603(4)(a). Under Idaho Code section 6-
1603, recklessness is relevant only if a jury awards non-economic damages in excess of the 
statutory cap. Idaho Code section 6-1603 specifically provides a jury should not be informed of 
the cap during its deliberations. See l.C. § 6-1603(3) ("If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall 
not be informed of the limitation contained in subsection (I) of this section."). The trial court's 
decision to bifurcate the recklessness issue was consistent with this legislatively recognized 
policy of not allowing the non-economic damages cap to influence the jury's deliberations. 
C. Instructing the Jury had the Potential to Unfairly Prejudice Dr. Dille. 
The issue ofreckless conduct was inapplicable to Dr. Dille. Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence Dr. Dille was reckless. In fact, the only Plaintiffs' expert to opine regarding 
recklessness was Dr. Lipman. However, Dr. Lipman's reckless opinion was confined to Mr. 
Byrne, and did not address Dr. Dille. (Tr. Vol. l, p. 665, L. 19- p. 670, L. 13.). Plaintiffs' 
proposed instructions on the issue of recklessness did not differentiate between Dr. Dille and Mr, 
Byrne, however. Thus, had the requested instruction been given there was a real risk that the 
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jury would have been substantially confused. Indeed, it may have led the jury to erroneously 
consider whether Dr. Dille was reckless, despite the lack of any supporting competent evidence. 
In addition, allowing the jury to consider recklessness before having found negligence 
created a potential to either confuse the jury, or worse, invite them to "compromise" their verdict 
by settling on a "negligence" finding; i.e., the potential to "argue recklessness falling back to a 
negligence position" as a compromise. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 1883, L. 11 - p. I 884, L. 4). It is the very 
concern that the jury might improperly confuse a determination of negligence and recklessness 
that Plaintiffs argue as the reason it was error to not instruct on recklessness. Astonishingly, 
Plaintiffs assert, "While attorneys and judges easily recognize that negligence constitutes a lesser 
degree of harmful conduct than recklessness, juries can just as easily perceive them to be two 
different characterizations of conduct. ... It is entirely possible in the minds of the Jury, the 
Respondents were reckless, but they were not negligent." See Appellants' Opening Brief, at pp. 
35-36. Indeed, it is this very problem, the inappropriate intentional or unknowing jury 
nullification of the law that the District Court guarded against by bifurcating the recklessness 
issue. 
In comparison, the alleged potential prejudice to the Plaintiffs is very slight. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs complain that they might have been prejudiced, because they elicited testimony 
concerning Mr. Byrne's alleged recklessness, but were unable to argue the point to the jury. 
However, given that the jury heard literally just a few questions concerning recklessness in the 
course of two and a half weeks of trial, it is unlikely that the lack of an instruction concerning 
recklessness caused any prejudice to Plaintiffs whatsoever. Indeed, the jury heard far more 
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testimony about the ID AP As that Plaintiffs elicited, yet the Plaintiffs consciously elected not to 
address these regulations in closing arguments. 
D. As the Jury Found No Negligence, the Issue of Recklessness was Irrelevant and 
Not Instructing the Jury was at Worst, Harmless Error. 
Plaintiffs cite no authority supporting the proposition a jury can find recklessness without 
first finding negligence. Indeed, the very suggestion that recklessness could exist in the absence 
of negligence is contrary to common sense. Because reckless conduct is conduct bearing a higher 
degree of culpability than negligent conduct, one cannot be reckless without first being 
negligent. Even Plaintiffs' own proposed instruction begins, "The words "reckless conduct" 
when used in these instructions and when applied to the allegations in this case, mean more than 
ordinary negligence .... "(R. Vol. 3, p. 343) (Emphasis added). Therefore, if Mr. Byrne was not 
negligent, he could not be reckless. 31 Many Idaho cases recognize the distinction between 
"negligence" and "recklessness." See e.g., Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 
902 (2005); Galloway v. Walker, 140 Idaho 672, 676, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2004). Even 
BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY recognizes the fact that recklessness embraces a higher standard than 
negligence and states in its definition of recklessness that, "Recklessness involves a greater 
31 The contention that Mr. Byrne could be liable for recklessness without being found to have 
negligently breached the standard of care is contrary to Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
These statutes require a plaintiff seeking damages for injuries arising from medical care to prove 
through direct expert testimony and a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
"negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice ... " (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, a finding of recklessness without negligence is not only impossible under Idaho law, 
but it cannot support a damages award in a medical malpractice case. 
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degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than intentional wrongdoing." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (7th Ed. 1999). 
Given that the jury found that neither Defendant negligently breached the standard of 
care, neither could be found to have been liable. Thus, any error in bifurcating the recklessness 
issue was harmless and did not affect a substantial right of Plaintiffs. As such, the District 
Court's decision denying a new trial should be upheld. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the facts, authorities and arguments discussed above, it is clear that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested new trial. As such, the 
decision should be affirmed by this Court, and attorney fees and costs awarded to Respondents. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 18th day of December, 2008 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain 
Institute 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this I 8th day of December, 2008, I caused to be served two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing by hand delivery to all rties' counsel of record in 
compliance with Idaho Appellant Rule 34( d). 
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TITLE 01 
CHAPTER 03 
22.01.03 - RULES FOR THE LICENSURE OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Pursuant to ld<1ho Code Section 54-1806(2), the {daho Stale Board of Medicine is authorized to promulgate rules Lo 
govern activitieti of persons licensed under these rules to praclice as physician assistants und graduate physiciun 
<1ssistonts under the supervision of pctsons licensed to proc1icc medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and 
surgery in IJ11/io. (3-16-04) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
01. 
Assistants". 
Title. These rules shall be cited as fDAPA 22.01.03 1 "Rules for the Llccnsurc of Physician (3-19-99) 
02. Scope. Pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 54-1807(2), physician assislonls and graduate physician 
nssislnnls must be licensed with the Board prior to commencement of activities. (3~16-04) 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
Written interpretations of these rules in the form of explanatory comments accompanying the notice of proposed 
rulemaking that originally proposed the rules and review of comments submitted in the rulcmaking process in lhc 
nt!option of these mies arc available for review and copyir.ig at cost from the Board of Medicine, 1755 Westgate 
Urive, Suite 140, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0058. (3-16-04) 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL. 
All contcslt'd case:; slrnl! be governed by the provisions of IDAPA 04.1 l.O l f "Idaho Rules of /\dminislrutivc: 
Procedures of the /\Horney General" and fDAPA 22.01.07, "Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Board of 
Medicine". (3-15-02) 
004. PUBLIC RECORD ACT COMPLIANCE. 
These rules h:lVe been promulgated according lo the provisions ofTitfe 67, Chapter 52, (daho Cadc 1 und urn public 
records. (3-15-02) 
!HIS. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
There urc no documents incorporated by rcforcnce into this rule. (3-J 5-02) 
01)(,, OFFJC£ -· OFFICE HOURS -- MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS. 
The centrul office or lhe 8ourd of Medicine will be in Boise, lduho. The Board's mailing nddrcss1 unle!:ls otherwise 
iotlicatcd, will be Idaho Stale Board of Medicine, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0058. The Board's slrcct 
address is 1755 Wcntgutc Drive, Suite 140, Boise, Idaho 8-3704. The telephone number oftlrn Board is (208) 327-
7000. The Board's facsimile (FAX) number is (208) 327-7005. The Board's office hours for filing documcnls arc 8 
a.111. lo 5 p.111. (3-16-04) 
007. l'IL!NG OF DOCUMENTS -NUMBER OF COPIES. 
All documenls in ru!c~muking or contested case proceedings must be fi!e;d with the office of the Board. The original 
11nd ten (10) copies of all documents rnust be filed with Lhc office of UlC Board. (3wl 5-02) 
008. -- OOY. (RESERVED). 
OIO. DEf<'fN!T!ONS. 
01. A!tern.ite Supervising Phy.ski:in. A physician registered with the Board, ns set forth in lDAPA 
22,01.04, "Rules of the Board of Medicine for Rcgistralion of Supervising and Directing Physicians," under an 
agreement as defined in these rules, who is responsible for supervising the physician assistant or graduate physician 
assistnnt in the temporary obsencc of the supervising physician. The alternate supen1 ising physician shall accept full 
medical rcsponsibl!i1y for the performance, practice; and activities of such licensee being supervised. An alternate 
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:rnpcrviiiing physicitm shall not. supervise more than three (3) physician nssistant'i or grn<luntc physician assistants 
contcmpornncously. The Bm1rd, however, may mnhori:w an alternate supervising physician Lo supervise a tolal of six 
(6) ~wch licensee~ contemporaneously if necessary to provide adequate medical Care and iipon prior petition 
documenling ndcqualc safeguards to protect the public health nnd safety. (3* 16*04) 
02. Approved Program. A course of study for the education ond trnining of physician assistants which 
is ucercditcd by the Committee. on A!lic.d Health Education and Accreditation) the Commission on Accreditation of 
Allied Health Education Programs, the Accreditation Review Commission on Education for Physician Assistants 
(ARC-PA) orcquivalcnl agency recognized by the Board as recommended by lhc Committee. (3-16-04) 
OJ. Board, The lduho State Board of Medicine established pursuant to Section 54-1805, Idaho Code. 
(3-16-04) 
04. Delegation Of Services (DOS) AgreemeoL A written document mutuufly agreed upon and signed 
anJ dated by the licensed physician assistant or graduate physician assistant and !-iUpervising physician lhat defines 
the working relationship and delcgulion ofdultcs betwee.n the supervising physicinn and the licensee as specified by 
Ooarc/ rule, The Bm1rd s/ia./1 review Ille wr/Ucn delegation of services iigrccmcnt and may review job descriptions, 
policy stutcments, or other documcn'ts thut define the responsibilities of the physician assistunt or grnduutc physician 
a!:isislnnt in the practice sctting1 und may require such changes as needed to achieve compliance \Vith these ru!cs1 and 
!o safeguard the public. (J-16~04) 
05. Graduate Physician Assistant. A person who is a graduate of an approved program for the 
t!Uucation and training of physician 4ssistants and who meets all the requirements in this chapter for Idaho liccnsurc, 
bul: (3-16-04) 
ll, Hus not yet taken and passed the certification examination and who has been uuthori2ed by the 
Bou rd, ns defined in Subsection 036.0 I of these rules, Lo render patient services under the direction of u supervising 
p/iysir.:it1n for a period ui'six (6} months; or (3~16-04) 
h. I-J;:1s passed the certification examination but who hns not yet obtained a college bncca)aurcatc 
degree and who has been authorized by the Board1 us defined in Subi;cction 036.02 of these rules, to render patient 
services under thl! direction of a supervising physician for o. period of not more than five (5) years. (3-! 6~04) 
06. Physician. A physician who holds a current active license issued by the Bourd to practice medicine 
and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery in [daho and is in good standing with no restrictions upon or aclions 
Lnkcn again!it his license. (3-16-04) 
07. Physician Assistant, A person who is a graduate of an approved program and who is quu!ified by 
:,;pucia lizcd ~ducution, training, expcrfonec and persona! character, as defined in Section 02 I of those rules, and who 
has been licensed by the Board to render palicnt services under the direction of n· supervising physician. (3-l 6-04} 
08. Physicfan Assistnnt Trainee. A person who is undergoing training at an approved program as ·a 
physician assistant and registered with the Board. (3~ 16-04) 
09. Supervision. The direction and oversight of the activities of and patient services provided by :i 
physician assistant or gn.iduntc physician assistant by a supervising physician who accepts full medical responsibility 
with respect thereto. The constant physical presence of the supervising or ultcmutc supervising physician is not 
required as long as the supervisor o.nd such licensee arc or can be easily in contact with one another by radio, 
telephone, or other tclccommunicalion device, The scope and nature of the supervision shall be outlined in a 
delegation of services agrccmcnlt as defined in Subsection 030.03 of these rules. (3-16-04) 
10. Supervising Physician. A physician registered by lhc Board, ::is set forth in IDAPA 22.01.04, 
"Rules of Lhc Board of Medicine for Registration of Supervising and Directing Physicians," and under an agreement 
t1.s defined in Subi;cction 030.03 of these rules, who Is rcspom;ible for the direction and supervision of the activities of 
antl p:iticnt :,;crvices provided by the physician us8:istant or graduate physician ossistunt. The supervising physician 
acccpts full medical responsibility for the activities of and patient services provided by sucldiccnsec. A supervising 
physiciun sh:.ill not supervise more than u total of three (3) physiciun assistants or graduate physician assistants 
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contcmponmcously. Thu Board, however, may authori<.e a supervising physician to supervise a total of six (6) such 
liccnsce.s contemporaneously if necessary to provide adequate medical care and upon prior pcLHion documenting 
adequate safoguords to protect the public health and safety, (3-16-04) 
Oil. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT ADVISORY COMMITTEE. 
A Physician Assistant Advisory Committee is hereby created and made a part of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, 
pursuant to ndoption of Resolution 0l-093. (3-16-04) 
0 I. Committee Appointments. The Board shall appoint the members of the Physician As~'iislant 
Advi!wry Committee. In making appointments to the Committee, the Board slrnll give consideration Lo 
rccommcnc.hHions made by professional organizations of physician assistants and physicians. lf recommendations arc 
nol made within sixty (60) days of notifo:::ition und request, the Board may mukc appointments of any qualified 
individuals. l n the event of a vacancy in one (I) of the positions, professional organizations muy recommend, as soon 
us practical, nt least two (2) nnd not more than three (3) pernons to fiH that vac,1ncy. The Board shall appoint 1 as soon 
as practicul1 one (I) per!mn, who shall till the unexpired term, Jf such professional organizations do not provide a 
recommendation, the Board slrn!l uppoint a person to the unexpired term. The Board may remove any Committee 
member for miscondt1cl, incompelency, or neglect of duly after giving the member n wrilt'en statement of the charges 
nnd an opportunity lo be heard thereon. The Executive Director of the Idaho State Board of Medlcine shall serve as 
the Executive Director to the Physician Assi~tanl Advisory Committee. (3- 16-04) 
02. Makeup Of Committee. The Commit'teo shall consist' of three (3) members appointed by the 
Bmird. Each member shall be currently licensed as a physician assistanl in Idaho and has been actively practicing as u 
physician assistant in Idaho for three (3) year immediately preceding appointment. Members will serve u term of 
three (3) years nnd terms will be staggered. Members may scn1c two (2) successive terms. The Committee shul! clccl 
<.1 chairman from its membership. The Committee shall meet as often as necessary lo fulfill iL,:; responsibilities. 
Members will bl.! compensated according to Section 59-509(h), Idaho Code. (3-16-04) 
03. l<inuJ Decisions. The Comm/t[Cc shall have no authority lo revoke liconsc!i or impose limitations or 
cond[tions on licenses i!:mucd under this chapter and shall be ttuthori:ccd only to make recommendations to the Board. 
The Board shall mukc all final decisions with respect thereto. (3-16-04) 
04. Board Affiliation. The Committee will work in the fof!owing areas in conjunction with and make 
r0con1mcndutions to the Board and will perfonn such other dulies and functions assigned to the Committee by the 
Board, including: (3-16-04) 
"· 
b. 
c. 
:,;tate; nnd 
Evnluating the qualifications of applicants for licensurc and registration; (3-l 6-04) 
Performing investigations of misconduct and making recommendations regarding discipline; 
(3-16-04) 
Maintaining a !isl of currently licensed physician assistants and graduate physician assistants in this 
(3-16-04) 
d, Advising the Board on rule changes necessary to license and regulate pbysicinn assis:tanl'i and 
gradumc physiciun u;;sistnnts in this state, (3-16-04) 
012-- 019. (RESERVE))). 
020. APPLICATION. 
01. License Applications. All applications for licensure as physician assistnnts und graduate physician 
ussistants shall be made to the Board on fom1s supplied by the Board ond include: payment of the prescribed fees. 
(3-16-04) 
02. Reapplication. If more than two (2) years have elapsed since a licemmd physiciun ussistant or 
~ruduatc physiciun assistant has uctivc!y engaged in practice, reapplication to the Board us a new applicant is 
rcq~1 ired. The Board nrny require evidence of an educationa f updJtc .'lnd close supervision lo assure safe and qualified 
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(3-16-04) 
OJ. Application .&xpiration. An application for !iccnsuro thal is not granlcd or license not issued 
within one (l) year from the date the application is received by the Board shall expire, However, the app!icnnl nniy 
make a written request to the Boord to consider his application on an individual busis, In its discretion, the Committee 
may mukc n detcm1ination if ex:trnordinary circumstances exist that justify extending the one {I) year lime period up 
to an udditional one ( l) year. The Committee: can recommend to the Board to grant the request for such extension of 
tirnc. The Board shull mukc al! final decisions with respect thereto, (3-16-04) 
1121. REQUIREMENTS FOR LfCENSURE. 
OJ. EducntionaJ Hequircmcnt. Applicants for liccnsure shall have completed an approved program 0s 
dcfin~d in Subsection O I 0.03 nnd $ha![ provide evidence of having received a college baccalaureate degree from a 
naliona!ly accredited school with a curriculum approved by the United States Secretary of Education, the Council for 
Higher Edw::ation Accreditalion, or both, or from a school accredited by another such agency approved by the Board. 
(3-16-04) 
02. National Certifying Examination. Satisfaclory completion nnd passage of lhc certifying 
cxuminnlion for physician assistants, administered by the Nat"ional Commission of Certification of Physiciun 
Assistant~ or such other cxamimilions, which may be wril'tcn, oral or prncfic;if, ns the Board may require, (3-19-99) 
03. Pcrso1rnl interview. The Board may ut its discretion, require the npplicant or the supervising 
physician or both to appeur for a persona! interview. {3- ! 9~99) 
114. Completion Of Form. (3-16-04) 
a. fl' the npplicanl ls to practice in Idaho, he must submit payment of the prescribed fee and a 
completed form provided by the Bou rd indicating: (3-) 6~04) 
i. The npplicnnt h<.1s completed u dc!cgulion of services agrcc111cnl ~igncd by the upplicant, 
supcrvl!dng physician and alternate supervising physicians; and (3-16-04) 
ii. The agreement is on fi[e at each practice locution and Lhc address of record of the supervising 
physich1n and at the central office of the Board; or (3-16-04) 
h. ff the nppfi'can( is nae to prnetfce in ldnlio, he must submit payment of the prescribed foe und a 
completed form provided by the Board indicating the applicanl is not practic;ing in Idaho and prior to pniclicing in 
lduho, the upplietrnt will meet the rcquircmen(s of Subsections 021.04.a.i. nod 021,04.n.ii. (3* 16*04) 
022. -- 025. (RESERVED). 
026. LICENSURll BY ENDORSEMENT. 
Rccipfocal liccnsurc or lict:nsurc by endorsement is not permitted and upp!icants currently registered or licensed in 
other stutcs musl comply with the requirements Bet forth in SccUon 021 in order t'o be licensed in Idaho. (3-/ 9w99) 
027. (RESERVED). 
028. SCOPE OF PRACTICE. 
01. Scope. The scope of practice of physiciun assistants and graduate physician ussistunts shall be 
defined in the delegation of services and may include i.l broad range of din gnostic, thcrnpeutic and health promotion 
und di sense prevention services. {3w I 6-04) 
a. Th!.! scopl! of proctice shall include only those duties and responsibilities delegated to the licensee 
by Lhcir supervising physician and in nccordnncc with the delegation of services agreement. (3~16~04) 
b. The scopi; of practice may Include prescribing, administering, and dispensing of medical devices 
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;,ind drugs, incluUing lhc udministrntion ofa local anesthetic injected subcutaneously1 digital blocks, or the application 
of topical anesthetics, while working under the supervision ofa licensed medical physician. Physlciun assistants and 
gradm!\c. physician assistants shall not administer or monilor genern! or regional block anesthesia during diagnostic 
tests, 5urgcry, or obstetric procedures. (3- f 6-04) 
c. Physician assistants and graduacc physic inn assistants are agents of their supervising physician in 
the performance of all prnctice-rclatcd activities and patient services. (3w l 6-04) 
d. A :mpervislng physician shall no! supervise more than a total of lhrcc (3) physician assistunls or 
gmduull.! physician assistants contemporaneously. The Board, however, may authorize n supervising physician (o 
supervise u total of six (6) such licensees contemporaneously if necessary to provide adcquale medical cure und upon 
prior pctilion documenting adequnte :mfcgunrds to protect the public hculth and safety. An u/tcmalc i.upervising 
physician shall not supervise more than three (3) physician assistants or graduate physician assistunts 
contempornncously. The Bonrd.1 however, may authorize nn alternate supervising physician lo supervise n total of six 
(6) such !iccn!iccs ct:mtcmponmcously if necessary to provide ndeqmltc medical care and upon prior petition 
documenting adequate safeguards to protect the public health and safety. {3~ 16-04) 
02. Pructicc. [nitiulc appropriutc loboralory or dia1,:rnoslio studies, or both, to screen or evaluate the 
puti0nt's heallh status and interpret reported infom1ation in accordance with knowledge C}f the laboratory or 
diagnostic studies, provided such laboratory or diagnostic studies are related to nnd consistent with the licensee's 
scope of practice. The scope of practice shall be limited to patient services under the supervision of the supervising 
physician: (3-16-04) 
a. 
nssisltinl; 
Within the education, training and experience of the physician assistant or graduate physician 
(3-16-04) 
h. Consistent wi!h lhc expertise and regu lnr scope of practice of the supervising physician; und 
(3-16-04) 
c. Rendered within Lhe parameters of the lows 1 rules, nnd standards ot the locn.tiom or focililics in 
which the physician nssistun! and gmdua(·c physic ion assistnnt practices. (3~ 16-04) 
029. CONTINUING EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS. 
0 l. Continuing Competence. A physician assistant or gradu(1tc physician ussistunt may be required by 
the Board at any lime to dcmonstrute conlinuing competence in the performance of nny practice related aclivity or 
patient service. (3-16-04) 
02. Requirements For Renewal. Every other year, and prior to renewal of each license us set forth by 
the cxpiralion dale on the face of the certificate, physician assistants and graduate physician nssistanls will be 
required to present evidence. of hlwing received one hundred (l 00) hours of continuing mcdieul cducrition over a two-
year puriod. The courses and credits shall be subject to upprova\ of lhe Board. (3-16-04) 
030. PRACTICE STANDARDS. 
OJ. Identification. The physici<m assistant, graduate phys:;iciun assistant nntl physician assi~tant trainoc 
must ,1t all limes when on duty wear a placard or pfalc so idcnlif)'ing himscif. (3-16-04/ 
02. Advertise. No physiciun ussislant, graduate physician assistant or physician assistant trainee may 
advcrlisc or represent himself either directly or indirectly, as a physician. (3~ ! 6~04) 
03. Dclcgution Of Services Agreement. Ench licensed physician assistant and graduate physician 
assistant shall muinlain a current copy of a. Dclcgntfon of Services (DOS) Agreement be-tween the licensee and each 
of his supervising physicians. The delegation of services agrcement1 made upon a form provide~ by the Board, shall 
include a listing of Lhc licensee's trnining, experience and cducution, and defines the patient services to be delegated, 
It is the responsibility of the licensee and supervising physician to maintain a current delegation of services 
ugrecmcnL All spccialilcd proct.:dures that need prior review and approval by the Board will be listed on the 
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delegation of services agreement fom1 supplied by the Board, Prior to provision, all licensees requesting to provide 
any of the listed services will be required to send their delegation of services agreement to the Board for approval. 
The Bonrd may require the supervising physician lo provide written information, which will include his affiduvil 
nllcsting l'o the l!Ccnscc's qualitfoations und clinical abilities to perform the .specific procedures listed in the 
<lclcg;.ition of .services ,1grccmcnt. This ..igrccmcnl shaH be sent to the Board u.nd must be maintained on file ilt co1ch 
prnclicc location .ind ,it the nddrcss of record of the supervising physician. The Committee will review this agreement 
in conjunction with and make recommendations to the Board. The Board may require such changes as needed to 
achiew compliance wilh this chapter and Tit'lo 54, Chapter J 8, Idaho Code, and to safoguard the public. This 
agrr.::emcnt shall include: (3-16-04) 
a. Documentation of the licensee's cducalion, training1 and experience and a listing of the specific 
patient services which will be performed by the licensee. (3-16-04) 
b. The specific locations nnd facilities in which the licensee will function; and (3-16-04) 
c. The wrilten plans and methods to be used to ensure responsible direction and control of the 
activities and patient services rendered by the licensee which shall provide for: (3-16~04) 
i. 
iL 
An on-silc visil ut lec1sl monthly; 
Regulnrly scheduled conferences between lhc supervising physician und the licensee; 
(3-19-99) 
(3- I 6-04) 
iii. Periodic review of a representative sample of records und a periodic review of the pnticnt' services 
being provided by tht? licensee. This review shall also include an cva/uaLion or adherence to the dclcgalion of services 
agreement; (3-16-04) 
iv. Availability of the supervising physician to the licensee in person or by telephone and procedures 
for providing backup and supervision in emergency situations; and (3-16-04) 
V. Procedures for addressing situations outside the scope of practice of the licensee. (3-16-04) 
d. The drug categories or specific legend drugs nnd controlled drugs, Schedule If through V that will 
be prescribed provided that the legend drugs and controlled drugs shall be consistent with the regular prescriptive 
prnctice of the supervising physician. (3-l 5-02) 
04, On-Site Review. The I3onrd. by and through its dcsigmHcd agcnls, is authorized to conduct on-::iilc 
reviews or the activities of phy~ician assisu.mts or grnduatc phy:iician assistants and lhe locations und focilllics in 
which the licensees pn!c{icc at such {imcs as l'lw Board deems nccessmy. (3-16-04) 
ll3l. PARTICIPATION JN DISASTER AND EMERGENCY CARE. 
A physician assistant or graduate physician assistant licensed in this state or licensed or authorized to practice in uny 
other state of the United States or cu1TCntly crcdentfalcd lo practice by a federal employer who is responding to c.1 need 
for patient services created by nn emergency or a state or local disaster (not lo be defined as an emergency situation 
which occurs in the place of one's employment) may render such patient services thut they arc able to provide without 
supervision us it is defined in this chapter, or with such suporvision as is available. Any physician who supervises <1 
physician m;sistanl or gn:idume physician assistant providing patient services in rcspon!-ic lo such an emergency or 
state or loco! disaster shall 1101· be required to meal the requirements set forth in this chapter for a .rnpervising 
physician. (3-16-04) 
032. -- 035. (RESERVED). 
036. GRADUAT!c l'HYStClAN ASSISTANT. 
01. Liccnsure Prior To Certification Examinution - Board Consideration. Any person who hus 
gruduntcd from ;:in ,1pproved progrnm and meets a/l idnho requirements, including achieving n college baccalaureate 
degree, but has not yet tnkcn ond passed the certification examination, may be considered by the Board for liccnsurc 
as" gniduatc physician assi;:;tanl for six (6) months when: (3-16-04) 
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u. An application for ficensurc as a graduate physician assistant has been submitted to the Board on 
forms supplied by the Board and payment of the prescribed fee. (3-16-04) 
b. The applicHnl promptly notifies the Board within ten (l 0) business days of receipt of the national 
c-<.!rtificution examination rcsul ts. (3-16-04) 
c. A n-cr lhc graduate physician assb,;tnnt has passed the certification examination, the Soun.I must 
rt:t:civc verification ofnatiom.11 ccrtificittion directly from the certifying entity, Once the vcrifictltion Is received by lhc 
13oard, the gra<lualc physician assistant's license will be converted to 0 permanent license und he muy r.!pp!y for 
prescribing authority pursuant to Section 042 of these rules. {3-16-04) 
d. The applicant who has foiled the certification examination one (I) time, may petition the Board for 
u one-time cxtcn!iion of his graduate physician assistant lfccnse for an additlom1\ six (6) monlhs. {3-l 6-04) 
c. If (he graduate physician assistant fails to pnss !he certifying cxaminDlion on two (2) separate 
occasions, the grnduatc physician assistant's license shnll aulomatically be canceled upon receipt of the second failil)g 
certification examination score. (3-16-04) 
f. Tile gntdm:Hc physician assistant applicant sha}) agree to execute an authorization for the release of 
information, attuchcd to his nppliculion ns Exhibit A1 authorizing the Board or its designated agents, having 
informution relevant to the app!ica.tion, including but not limited lo the status of the certification cxaminntion, to 
release such infonnation, as neccssary1 to his supervising physician. (3~ l 6~04) 
02. Licensur-e Prior to College Bacculaurcnte Degree ~ Board Consideration, Liccnsurc as a 
gruduttte physiciun assistant may also be considered upon application made to the Board on forms supplied by the 
Board nod p..tymenl of the prescribed fee when: (3~-t 6~04) 
:1. /\!l applicntion requirements have been met as scl forth in Section 021 1 except receipt of' 
tlocumcntation oro college bnccalourentc degree. A college bucca!aureate degree from o nationu!ty accredited school 
with H curriculum approved by lhe United States Secretary of Educa1ion, the Council for Higher Education 
Accrcditulion, or both, or from a school accredited by another such ugcncy approved by the Board s/1111/ be completed 
wilhin five (5) yenr.s ofinitiul liccnsurc in Idaho; (3-16~04) 
b. A pcrsonu! interview with the applicant or the supervising physician or both nrny be required :.md 
will be conducted by a designated member of the Board; und - (JN/6-04) 
. c. A p!nn shall be submitted with the application nnd shall be upprovcd by the Bonrd for the 
completion of the college bacculaureate degree, (3-16-04) 
03. No Prescribing Authority. Physician assislants operating under a grndualc physician assistant 
license shall nor bc·cntilled lo iS$Ue any written or oral prescriptions and i.hall be required to have a weekly record 
review by their !>Upctvising physician. {3~ 16-04) 
1137. IJISC!PL!NARY PROCEED!NGS AND NOT[F!CAT!ON Ofi' CHANGE. 
01. Discipline. Every penwn licensed as u physkiun assist~nt or graduate physician ,rnsistanl is subject 
to discipline pursuant to the procc:dutes nnd powers established by and set forth in Section 54-1806A, (daho Code and 
the Administrative Procedures Act, (3- J 6-04) 
02. Grounds For Discipline. In addition lo the grounds for discipline set forth in Section 54-1814, 
lduho Code und IDAPA 22.01.01, uRulcs of the Board of Medicine for the Liccnsure to Practice Medicine and 
Surgery and Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery in Idaho," Section 101, persons licensed under these rules are subject 
to discipline upon the following grounds if that person: (3-16-04) 
n. Hdd himself oot, or permitted unmher to rcpresenl him, to be a licensed physician; (3-t 6-04) 
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b. !Ind in foct performed otherwise !linn <.11 the discrc.!jon nnd under the supervision of n physiciun 
licensed by and registered with the Board; (3-16-04") 
c. 
d. 
Pcrformc:d a tusk or tasks beyond the scope of activities allowed by Section 028; 
Is l.l habitu«I or excessive user of intoxicants or drugs; 
(3. I 6-04) 
(3-16-04) 
e. Demonstrated manffest incapacily to carry out the functions of a physician agsistant or gradual'e 
physician assistant; (3-16-04) 
f. 
by Section 030; 
Fni/cd w c;ompletc or maintain a current topy of !'he deieg;ition of services agreement as specified 
(3-16-04) 
g. Puilcd to notify the Board of a change or addition of a superv1smg or allcrnatc supervising 
physician within two (2) weeks of the change us sptcificd by Subsection 037 .03; (3-16-04) 
h, Aided or abcltcd n person not licensed in this state who directly or indirectly pcrfom1s activities 
rnquiring a license; (3-! 6-04) 
i. Failed to report to lhe Board any known act or omission of a ltccnscc, npplican!, or any other 
person, which viol.afcs any provision of these rules; or (3wJ6-04) 
j. Interfered \Vith nn invesligation or disciplinary proceeding by willful misrepresentation offocts or 
by use of threats or Jwrnssmen! ugnjnst nny patient or witness to prevent them from providing evidence in a 
disciplinnry proceeding, investigation or other legal action. (3-16~04) 
03. Notification Of Change Or Addition Of Supervising Or Alternate Supervising Physichrn. A 
physiciun trnsistnnt or grnduatc physician assistant must notify the Board within (wo (2) weeks upon changing 
:mpcrvising physicians or alternate supervising physicinns or ndding an additional supervising physician. Such 
notificmion shall include: (3-16-04) 
a, The name, business address and telephone of the new or additionn! supervising physician or 
ul tcrmitu supervising phy!dcian(s ); (3-16-04) 
b. 
assistant; and 
c. 
The name, business address, and {c[cphont number of the phy!·dcian assislant or g,rudualc physician 
(3-16-04) 
Comply with the rcquircmcnt!:J of Subsection 030.03. (3-16-04) 
d. All supervising physicians and ultcrnnte supervising physicians must comply with the requirements 
off DAPA 12.01.04, uR.ulcs of the Board of MadiGinc for Registration of Supervising nnd Directing Physicians". 
(3-16-04) 
038. -- 040. (RES ERV ED). 
041. l'l!YSICiAN ASSISTANT TRA!NE:E:. 
01. Registration In Training. Any person undergoing training at an approved program as a physician 
ussistant must register with the Board as u trainee, and must comply with the rules as scl forth herein. All applications 
for registration shall be made lo the Board on fonns supplied by the Board and include payment of the prescribed fee. 
AH rcgislnHions shall be dependent upon the length of an approved program and shall be h:sucd for a period of not 
more than LWo (2) years. Al! regi~trations shall expire on the expiration date printed on the face of the certificate and 
shtttl become invalid after thut date. All upplications for an extension of not more. than two (2) years of current 
regi!ilntlion us 11 physician assistant trnincc shall be n1ade to lhc Board on forms supplied by (he Bon.rd and include 
p:1ymcnt or the prescribed ft:e. (3-16#04) 
02, Approved Prog:r:im. Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, a trainee muy pcrfonn 
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patient services when such services n.rc rendered within the scope of an approved program. (7-1-93) 
03. Registration Fees. The foe for registration as physicinn assis{ant trainee shall be no more than fifty 
dollnrs ($50). The fee for a one (I) time extension ofa current registration as physician assistant trainee shall be no 
more than nny dollars ($50). (3-16-04) 
042. PRESCRIPTION WR!TfNG. 
OJ, Approval And Authorization Required. A physician nssistant may issue written or oral 
prc:>criptions for legend drugs iind con(rolfcd drugs, Schedule II through V only in accordar1cc with approval mid 
aulhorizntion grunted by the Board and in accordance witll the current delegation of services agreement nod shnll be 
c.:onsistcnl with the rcgu!ur prc:;criptivc practice of the supervising physician. (3-15-02) 
02. Applic:ition. A physicinn nssistnnt who wishes to apply for prescription writing nulhority .shtiH 
:.ubmil to lhc Gourd on npplicution for such purpose on forms supplied by the Board. In nddition to the informmion 
contained in lhc general npplirntion for physician nssistunl approvnl, the application for prescription wri!ing authority 
slrnH include the following infomiation: (3-16-04) 
n. Documcnll.ltian of u!I phnrmacology course content completed, the length olml wholher a passing 
grudc was nchicvcd (nt lcma thirty (JO) hours). (7-l-93) 
b. A stnlemcnt of the frequency with which the supervising physician will review prcscriplions 
written or issued, (3-16-04) 
c. A signed aftidrivit from the supervising pl~ysidan certifying thnt 1 in the opinion o!'\'hc supervising 
physiciuti, the physician assistant is qualified to preseribc the drugs for which rhc physicinn u:.rnistant is seeking 
upprovnl ,rnd authorization. (3-16-04) 
d. The physician assistant to be authorized to prescribe Schedule II through V Jrugs shall be 
rogislcrcd with the Federal Drug Enforcement Administrntion and the Idaho Board of Pharmacy, {3-15-02) 
03, Prescription Forms, Prescription forms used by the physician assistant must be printed wftf1 the 
munc, address, and telephone number of the physician assistant and of the supervising physician. A physfciun 
m;sisuml shall not write prescriptions or complete or issue prescrlption blanks previously signed by any physician. 
(3-16-04) 
04. Record Kccplng. The phy:;ician assistant shall maintain accurnlc records, accounting for all 
prescriptions issued and mcdic,1tion dclivcrod, (3-16-04) 
05. Plrnrmnccutical Samples, The physician a:,;sistant who has prescriptive authority may request, 
receive, sign for und distribute professional samples of drugs and devices in accord·ance with his current delegution of 
services .igrccmcnl rind consbtcnl with the rcgulor proscriptive practice of the supervising physician, (3-16-04} 
1143. !JEUYE:RY OF MltllfCATION. 
0L Prc~Oispenscd Mcdicntion. The physicfon ~ssfstant may !eg~Hy provide n poiticnt with rnorc than 
one ( 1) dose of n. medication tll sites or at times when u pharmacM is not available. The pre-disp~nscd medications 
shul! be for un cml.'.!rgcncy period to be dclcm1incd on the basis of individi.m! circumstances, but the emergency period 
will ~xtcnrJ only until u prescription can be obtained from a pharmacy, (3-19-99) 
02. Consu ltnn t Pharmacist. The physiciun ussisto.nt shall have a consultant phnnnucisl responsible for 
pmv1tling tlw phy:,;ician ussislanl. with pre-dispensed medication in accordance with federal <ind stnte slututcs for 
packugin:g, labeling, and sraragc. (3-19-99) 
OJ, Limirntion Of Items. The pre-dispensed medication shull be limited to only those categories of' 
drug identified in the delegation of services agreement, except u physician assistant may provide other necessary 
emergency medication to the puti~nl' us directed by u physichrn. (J-)9-99) 
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04. Exception From Emergency Period. Physician assistants in agencies, clinics or both, providing 
family planning, communicable disease and chronic disease services under government contract or grnnt may provide 
prc-disocnscd medication for these specific services and ~hall be exempt from the emergency period. Physician 
assistn~ts in agencies, clinics or both, in remote sites without pharmacies shall be exempt from the emergency period, 
providing that they must Sl1bmit an npp!tcalion and ob1nin formal approval from the Boord. (3- 16-04) 
1144. -- 1150. (RESERVIW). 
1151. flEES- LICENSE ISSUANCE, RENEWAL, CANCELLATION AND REINSTATEMENT. 
/\II licenses to pn1cticc as a physician assistant or graduate physician ussist.ant shall be Issued for a period of not more 
thun five (5) yc:;1rs. All !iccns<rn shall expire on the expiration dale printed on the face of the certificate and shall 
become invalid uft'cr that date unless renewed. The Board shall collect u fee for each renewal ycur. TI1e failure of any 
person to renew his license shall not deprive such person of the right to renewal, except as provided for herein and 
Title 67, Chapter 51, Idaho Code. (3-16-04) 
Ol. Liccnsorc Fee. The fee for initial liccnsure shall be no more lhun !wo hundred twenty dollars 
($220) for a physiclun nssisrnnt and gradu~tc phyRician ussislanL (3~ I 6~04) 
02, License Renewal Fee. The Board shall collect a fee ofno more !han one hundred dollars ($100) for 
erich renewal ycur ofn license. (3.J6-04) 
03. License Cnncdbtioo. (J-16-04) 
n. Failure to renew a license to practice us a physiciim assistant and pay the renown! foe shall cause the 
!iccm:c to be canceled. However, such license cun be renewed up to two (2) yc1.1rs following cancellution by payment 
of past renewal fees, plus a penalty foe of twcnly-tivc dollars ($25). After lwo (2) years, an initial application for 
liccnsurc with payment of the appropriate fee shall be filed with the Board. In nddition, lbc Board mny require 
evidence of an educational update and close supervision to assure safe and qua! ificd perfonnancc. (3w J 6-04) 
b. Pai lure lo renew a license to practice as a graduate physician assistant and pay the renewal fee shall 
cuusc the license to be canceled. However, such license can be renewed up to six (6) months following cancellation 
by payrnent of the past renewal fee! plus a penalty fee of no more than fifty dollars ($50). After six (6) months, nn 
original ;ipp/icHl'ion for liccnsure with payment of the appropriate foe shali be filod wilh the Board. (3-16-04) 
04. Inactive License, (3-16-04) 
a. A person holding n .current Hccnse issued by the Board to practlcc as a physiC!an assistant may be 
i::;sucd, upon written application provided by the Board and payment ofrequired fees to the Board, an inactive license 
on the condition lhal he will not engage in the provision of patient services a::; a physician assistant in this state. An 
ini/iijl inactive license /'Cu ofno more than one hundred fifly dollars($ 150) shall be collected by the Board. (3-J 6-04) 
b. lmictivu licenses shall be issued for a period of not more than five (5) years and such licenses shol! 
be renewed upon puymem of nn inactive license renewal fee of no more than one hundred dollars ($ l 00) for each 
renewal yeur. The inactive license ccrlificnte shall set forth its date of expiration. (3-16-04) 
c. An inactive license may be convcrt0d to an uctivc license to practice us a physichi.n assistant upon 
written upp!ication and payment of required conversion fees of no more tlrnn one lrnndrcd fifty dollars ($150) to the 
Board. The applicant must account for the time during which un inactive license wus held and documcnL continuing 
competence. The Board muy, in its discretion, require u personal interview to evaluate the upplicnnL's quulificatlons. 
In addition, the 8onrcl may require evidence of un educational update and close supervision lo assure safe und 
qualified performance. (3~ 16-04) 
052. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
These rules shall be ctfoctivc May 5, 1982. Prescriptive privileges and further nmendmcnls effective hi!n~ch 24, 1989. 
l'roloculs und further umcndments shall be effective after March 30, 1992. Amendments providrng graduolc 
physician'!> assistant registration cffccl'ivc April 2, 1993. (7-1-93) 
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Within one hundred twenty ( 120) days of the effective date of these rules, a!! cunenlly liccnst:d physichln a,:;sistants 
and gradumc physician asslstams shall have a wriltcn dcleg~1tion of services agreement us specified in Section 030of 
these rules. (3-16-04) 
054 .•• 999. (RILSERVED). 
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